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CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, El Salvador's civil war formally came to an end.
After years of arduous negotiations between the Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front (FMLN)
,
two Salvadoran administrations,
and the Salvadoran Armed Forces, an agreement was reached
that, if fully implemented, will have unprecedented results.
At the ceremony celebrating the historic accords, UN secretary
general Boutrous-Ghali proclaimed, "the long night of El
Salvador is reaching its end [T]hese accords will create a
revolution achieved by negotiation" (Karl, 1992a) . Whether or
not the changes will be "revolutionary" remains to be seen,
nevertheless, optimism is running high that the country's
human rights abuses, gross socio-economic inequalities, and
unrepresentative political system will improve so that El
Salvador will become one of Latin America's new democracies.
Most observers of recent events in El Salvador agree that the
process of transition will be a long and difficult one. One
of the most difficult tasks will be reigning in the country's
powerful military and subjecting them to the rule of law and
civilian authority.
The Christiani government pledged to reduce radically the
power of the armed forces and reform major areas of civilian
governance. It agreed to halve the 63,000-member military
over a two-year period, to disband five counterinsurgency
battalions linked to severe human rights abuses, to create a
1
new civilian police force in which ex-FMLN combatants would
participate, and to purge the military of abusive officers
(Constable, 1992). This is unprecedented. The role of the
military, while criticized by opposition parties, the FMLN,
and foreign observers, has never been seriously challenged.
One of the major achievements of the peace accords is that for
the first time since El Salvador's independence in 1821, the
role of the armed forces is being debated and acted upon by
P°Iitical parties, the government administration, the FMLN,
and the military itself. This achievement alone is
significant and has implications at least as wide-ranging as
the results of the accords (Garcia, 1992)
.
In a recent statement, the Salvadoran Defense Ministry
confirmed the armed forces' subordination to civilian
authority and their "unbreakable democratic convictions"
(Golden, 1992) . Despite such ambitious reforms and lofty
rhetoric, however, the Salvadoran military remains one of the
primary obstacles to any kind of political change in El
Salvador. It is important to remember that the end of the
civil war was not brought about by "unbreakable democratic
convictions" on either side of the conflict. After twelve
years of conflict the war in El Salvador had long since
reached a military stalemate. As early as 1984, despite
confident predictions from commanders on both sides, the war
had reached a draw. El Salvador faced a set of international
2
and domestic circumstances that prevented an authoritarian or
a revolutionary outcome (Karl, 1992)
.
Terry Lynn Karl, an astute observer of Salvadoran
politics, offered a warning: "...ending the war does not
necessarily mean winning the peace. Reactionaries and
revanchists remain, key issues have been postponed rather than
resolved, and fear and uncertainty can be expected to persist,
at least until El Salvador's March 1992 presidential
elections" (Karl, 1992). A military stalemate, as well as
economic malaise and El Salvador's status as international
pariah, forced the military to accept the via democratica. as
a modus vivendi rather than out of any profound conviction in
democratic ideals. Questions about the military's role and
subservience to civilian authority, however, are likely to
extend well beyond El Salvador's upcoming elections.
In this thesis I seek to answer a basic question: How is
the behavior of the Salvadoran military best explained? To
answer this question, a re-examination of the methods by which
the Salvadoran military's behavior is explained and understood
will be necessary. As Alfred Stepan explains, "...the
military has probably been the least studied of the factors
involved in new democratic movements .... In many of the newly
democratizing polities, the absence of a tradition of
autonomous civilian thought about military affairs is now
emerging as a critical problem" (1988, p.xi).
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A current trend in research on Latin America is a focus
on the transition to democracy and the factors that effect its
consolidation (Karl, 1990). The literature is replete with
that detail how democratic regimes emerge, yet is
relatively barren of thorough examinations of one of the
institutions most able to thwart democratic gains—the
military. Karen Remmer explains:
The majority [of works on the military] either focus on
the structural, ideological, and situational
preconditions for military seizures of power or provide
analyses of transitions from military to civilian
governments ... the result is a body of literature that
fails to add up to or provide a solid basis for
theorizing about military rule (1989, pp. 23-24).
El Salvador is heralded by many as another example of a
country to emerge from authoritarianism and to move toward
democracy. As important as many of the changes in El Salvador
are, conspicuously absent are any thorough examinations of the
Salvadoran military. A perusal through the cumulative pages
of the Journal of Latin American Studies, Latin American
Research Review, and Latin American Perspectives—some seventy
years of collective research
—
yielded not one single article
on the Salvadoran military. El Salvador has had the longest
experience with institutional military rule in all of Latin
America, yet the military is given little independent weight
as a subject of research (Christian, 1986) . When the armed
forces are discussed it is usually as a sub-theme of human
rights abuses, counter-insurgency programs, or US foreign
policy.
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To some, the Salvadoran military invokes images of
shadowy deathsquads dragging suspected subversives from their
sleep to violent deaths. By contrast, the military has also
been portrayed by governments in San Salvador and Washington
as abusive at times, but an essential institution fighting for
democracy against communist insurgency. in an article in
World Affairs
,
Heyward G. Hutson explained, "if there's one
thing the Salvadoran armed forces have done right from the
beginning, it has been to support social, political, and
economic reforms. . .the armed forces have been stalwart
defenders of land reform, elections, a democratic political
system, and a professional military" (1984, p.267). Such a
view contradicts Salvadoran reality. What little literature
exists on El Salvador's military often puts them in such terms
of black and white: Deathsquads or democrats?
In addition to El Salvador's current political situation,
the myths that surround many commonly held perceptions of the
military also point to the need for a reassessment of the
Salvadoran armed forces. Describing the military as the
"guard-dog of the elite" or as rabid, anti-communist
deathsquads offers little explanation of the armed force's
variously personalistic
,
institutionalized, and reformist
behavior throughout the country's history. As Shirley
Christian explains,
Most of the outside world has come to look on the
Salvadoran military as a murderous, repressive,
monolithic institution—the problem, if you will. But
there is also another side of the Salvadoran military
5
the one that is looking for solutions to thecountry s social economic, and political problems, andthat is willing to break with the past to find them. itis a military that cannot be characterized only with aset of good-bad, black-white images (1986, p. 9 l).
What is lacking from much of the literature are thorough
investigations of the military's behavior and place in
Salvadoran history that transcends partisan hyperbole. In the
course of this thesis, I will discuss four broad themes that
surround the history of the Salvadoran military.
First, the history of the military reveals an ongoing
cycle of repression and reform. The military is not a
uniformly repressive, monolithic institution as it is often
portrayed, but one constancy in search of Gramscian hegemony. 1
Second and relatedly, the military's history has been shaped
by the political activity and intervention of groups of young,
1
I acknowledge the absence of any commonly accepted
definitions of hegemony. In Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell
Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New
York: International Publishers, 1971), the difference between
"rule" and "hegemony" is explained. Rule is the outright use of
force while hegemony is the exercise of leadership with popular
consent, see pp. 80, 180-5, 243-4, 366-7, 402-3. In another
treatment of the term, Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature
(Oxford University Press, 1977) defined hegemony as "a whole body
of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our sense
and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and
our world. It is a lived system of systems of meanings and values-
-constituted and constituting—which as they are experienced as
practices appear as reciprocally confirming," see pp. 108-14.
Williams makes two distinctions in his definition that seem
particularly relevant to El Salvador's military. First, hegemony
does not exist passively. It has to be continually renewed,
recreated, defended, and modified. Second, although hegemony or a
hegemonic actor is always dominant, it is never total or exclusive,
"...any hegemonic process must be continually alert and responsive
to the alternatives and opposition which question and threaten its
dominance," see pp. 110 -14.
6
This
progressive officers known as the juventud militar.
reveals an institution constantly racked by internal tensions
and dissent. Third, despite years of training and
indoctrination, the Salvadoran military has remained a
profoundly unprofessional institution
.
2 Fourth and finally,
the themes mentioned above lead to a characterization of the
military's behavior as a preeminently political organization
with its own institutional interests, resources, and goals.
An understanding of these cycles and themes produces a
deeper understanding of the Salvadoran military than is
generally provided in much of the associated literature. To
the extent that the military is undertheorized, I hope to
arrive at a better understanding of what such a theory must
do. I will argue that an explanation of the Salvadoran
military must be rooted in what I see as its political
behavior. Only a political explanation can account for the
military's complicated and often seemingly contradictory
behavior
.
In chapter one, I will present a survey of the
theoretical literature that purports to explain the actions
and motivations of Latin American militaries. I will focus on
three schools of thought: dependency theory, corporatism, and
politically-based explanations.
2 A professional military is one characterized by a stable
command structure, standardized means of promotion,
bureaucratization, and apolitical behavior.
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My research has shown these three themes to be
recurrent means of explaining military behavior. The
approaches are not necessarily coherent bodies of theory, nor
are they theories specifically about the military. Each is
demonstrative of a particular approach to understanding
military phenomena. As stated, I find a political approach
most useful. I will examine economic and cultural
explanations of military behavior because I find both to be of
some use. I present them here to show where they lend to an
understanding of the military's behavior and where they fall
short
.
Chapters two through four will comprise the historical
section of the thesis. I believe an understanding of the
military must extend beyond the institution's often-cited
recent history and include a discussion of its early history
and formation. In chapter two, I will present a discussion of
the military from its inception to the rise, and later demise,
of personali stic military rule. In chapter three, I will
discuss the period characterized by institutional military
rule up to the military-led coup of 1979. Picking up where
the preceding chapter left off, chapter four will focus on the
country's descent into civil-war, the role played by the
United States, and the negotiated settlement of 1992.
Finally, in chapter five I will cast the history of the
Salvadoran military against the three theories presented in
chapter one. My purpose here is to access the merit of the
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theories, identify lacunae that exist, and suggest directions
for future research. In so doing, I hope to arrive at a better
definition of the military and a more thorough understanding
of its behavior.
In the course of this thesis, there are several basic
questions I want to address. How was military dominance
established and how has it been maintained? Is the Salvadoran
military a product of the state or society? How has the
politization" of the military and the "militarization" of the
state occurred? What is the state in El Salvador? What is
the military's "world view" or ideology? How have the ideals
of "institutionalization" and "professionalization" been
advanced? Why has the military acquiesced to civilian
authority? And what are the chances for a true democratic
opening in El Salvador? I will address these questions in
both the historical section as well as in the concluding
chapter
.
As will be shown, the Salvadoran military is made up of
many disparate elements. It is a dynamic and often volatile
institution that is not readily explained. What little work
exists on the Salvadoran military often gives undue weight to
certain phenomena while ignoring disparate data that does not
fit with a particular ontology. A recognition of its
political nature and the recurring themes that run through its
history lend to a more thorough explanation of the Salvadoran
military's multi-faceted nature.
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Background
Since the 1960s, the military has probably been the
subject of more research and analysis than any other social
force or actor in Latin America (Schmitter, 1973). This
concern will likely continue despite the recent decline in
authoritarian military regimes, for the military in Latin
America continues to be a potent actor.
Militaries and military rule have been studied more in
terms of processes of transition to and from democracy rather
than as political actors and political systems in their own
right (Remmer, 1989). Similarly, the militaries of Latin
America are often presented as a means of discussing the
relative success of US foreign policy and its impact abroad.
All too absent are discussions of the military that deal with
the military as an entity unto itself.
Theorizing about the behavior of the military has been an
on-going process. My intention here is not to locate the
theory that fits best in El Salvador. I believe efforts to
locate the single most important cause or determinant are
flawed because an unspecified, and perhaps unknowable, number
of factors are at play in any given situation. Social
phenomena and theory that seeks to explain are overdetermined.
Richard Wolff and Michael Resnick, two advocates of an anti-
reductionist approach, explain:
If all possible entities are overdetermined, none is
independent of the other. Moreover, each entity will
have a different, particular relation to every other
entity. Each entity exists as—or is caused or
10
totality of their differentrelations with all other entities
( 1987
, p.5).
Thus not only is multiple causality at play, but so is
multiple influence. Locating the defining factor or
determinant is not possible. Regarding the Salvadoran
military, it is impossible to state persuasively that economic
explanations, for example, can be identified as the "core" of
the institution's behavior. To do so would exclude other
relevant determinants or at least to relegate them to an
inessential" status. Further, the Salvadoran military, like
other actors in the country, is an institution that is
constantly changing and evolving. An explanation that seemed
to hold true in one historical moment may prove irrelevant in
another. My point here is not to say that it is impossible to
state what it is that constitutes and affects the behavior of
the Salvadoran military, but that like any other social actor,
its motivations, conduct, and ideology are overdetermined and
thus not reducible to a singular, parsimonious explanation.
The general survey that follows may seem to contradict
what is stated above, for I will examine several decidedly
essentialist theoretical categories: economic, cultural, and
political. It is not my intention to set up a line straw men
only to knock them down. Rather, I hope to show that each
approach is both useful and limited in its own way. My
purpose is to identify the main questions regarding military
behavior and to point out the salient issues and debates that
surround them. Because of the over-determination of the
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Salvadoran military's behavior, I expect different theories
will each offer partial explanatory power.
In what I am labelling as economic theory, I will focus
on dependency theory. In so doing, I will also discuss
briefly the related propositions in modernization theory and
the bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) model. In the category of
cultural theory, I will discuss corporatism and various
explanations that emphasize the weight of the "Iberian legacy"
and Latin America's propensity for militarization and
authoritarianism. And finally, in the section on political
explanations, I will discuss institutional and political
approaches propounded by such scholars as Alfred Stepan,
Samuel Fitch, and Karen Remmer
. By breaking these theories
into three categories I do not mean to imply that they are
separate, mutually exclusive bodies of inquiry. Indeed,
labelling them "theories" may give the impression that they
are cohesive epistemologies. They are not. I assume these
various approaches overlap and work in conjunction with each
other. Economic, cultural, political, and other forces can
all be said to affect a society or institution at any given
time
.
The State
Before delving into the debates and questions surrounding
these three approaches, it is necessary to discuss the
fundamental role of the state and its relation to military
12
establishments. An understanding of the state in Latin
America is of particular importance because it seems to defy
easy characterization. Generally, the state is defined in
either Weberian or Marxist terms.
The Weberian conception of the state is defined as an
administrative and legal order subject to change by the
legislature. This system of order claims binding authority
over all action taking place in the arena of its jurisdiction.
This is a rational-legal definition in which the state claims
a monopoly on the use of force (Parsons, 1964)
. in theory,
the Weberian state acts in the interests of the whole
(Hamilton, 1982). The Weberian tradition takes for granted
that states are potentially autonomous and may pursue goals at
odds with the various dominant groups and classes (Evans,
Skocpol, and Rueschemeyer
,
1985)
.
By contrast, the Marxist conception of the state regards
it as an instrument of class rule or an arena for class
conflict. The common, unquestioned assumption is that the
state is shaped by class struggle and functions to preserve
and expand the modes of production (Evans, Skocpol, and
Rueschemeyer, 1985) . The fact that Marxists regard economic
structures as the basis for the political superstructure
necessarily entails a rejection of the Weberian assumption
that the state provides procedural guarantees for free
political and economic competition (Stepan, 1978) . As will
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be shown later, however, the Salvadoran state does not fit
neatly within either of these traditions.
The state in El Salvador has traditionally been an area
of conflict and multiple interests. Death squad activity
demonstrates this and points to the "vagueness" of the state
in El Salvador. At least until 1984, deathsquads were serving
the interests of the Salvadoran government, and the lack of
progress made by the judicial and executive system in curbing
their "excesses" was related to the belief the state interests
were being served. with the election of Duarte in 1984,
however, it became clear that deathsquads did not kill in his
name, and yet continued to operate as a part of the state
(Stohl and Lopez, 1986) . How is such a state described if it
cannot be conceived as politically neutral or as an instrument
of class rule? Throughout this thesis I hope to show the
limitations of the Weberian and Marxist traditions and for the
need to rethink the role of the state and its relation to the
military in El Salvador. As I will make clear, the military's
state role is an ambiguous one. The military serves state
interests, but it also is influenced by economic groups,
cultural traditions, US interests, and its own institutional
interests
.
Economic Explanations
Economic theories refer to the production and
distribution of the means of production and consumption (Wolff
14
and Resnick, 1987). Although the majority of this section
Will focus on how dependency theory explains the military’s
behavior, modernization theory and the bureaucratic
authoritarian model will be mentioned as a means of
identifying the development of the literature. The three
approaches—modernization theory, dependency, and
bureaucratic-authoritarianism—represent a rough progression
of models that give primacy to economic factors. None of the
methodologies deals explicitly with the military. Generally
speaking, all paradigms afford the military a special
significance, but not as the primary subject of inquiry.
George Phillip, in his work The Military in Latin
American Politics
,
cites the intellectual climate in the 1960s
and its effect on American political science as the origin of
"serious study" of the military in Latin America (1985, p.3).
The Cuban revolution, the Kennedy administration, the Vietnam
war, and the behavioralist movement in the social sciences are
some of the main factors that contributed to a more concerted
to understand the dynamics of military behavior.
Events in Cuba had wide-ranging impact. For many U.S.
officials and academics, the "lesson" of the Cuban revolution,
was that military dictatorships in Latin America encouraged
Marxist revolutions whereas civilian governments did not.
Therefore, it became Washington's policy under Kennedy to
coddle civilian governments and oppose military ones (Black,
1986) . "Although this pro-civilian policy was not followed
15
With total consistency throughout Latin America," Phillip
says, "it was the commonly accepted wisdom both in the
Administration and within liberal academic circles that
military rule was a bad thing, not only in moral terms but
also in terms of immediate US interests (1985, p.2). These
convictions, coupled with a belief in the "democratizing"
effect of economic growth, produced a loose collection of
models now collectively known as modernization theory
(Lieuwen, 1961)
.
Part of modernization theory holds that as a country
modernizes economically, the country's social and political
institutions will evolve into more representative forms that
are responsive to popular demands. Militaries which once
thrived under conditions of underdevelopment, the theory
states, will either reform themselves and join the
modernization process or simply fade out as a repressive
political force in the country and assume a more strictly
defined state role. The Alliance for Progress and other
civic-action programs sought to cultivate this latent
progressive element in military institutions. The wave of
military-authoritarian regimes that brought the demise of the
region's "democracies", however, seemed to reduce
modernization theory to wishful thinking.
16
Dependency
The rise of military-dominated governments in countries
relatively "developed" or "modernized" like Brazil and
Argentina, contradicted most of what the modernization theory
held to be true. Military coups in Brazil (1964), Chile
(1973), Uruguay (1973), and Argentina (1976) dispelled the
belief that with economic modernization the military would
become an apolitical or progressive institution. The nations
of Central America, save Costa Rica, do not have a history of
democracy like their South American neighbors did. Efforts to
professionalize the military in Central America did little to
shake years of military dictatorship.
Where modernization theory emphasized the positive
effects of economic development for countries of the Third
World, dependency theory represented the inverse of this
proposition. Dependency theory is best seen as a reaction
against mainstream ideas about Latin America developed in the
1950s and 1960s. Rather than producing democratic societies
in which the military was subservient to civilian authority,
dependency theory predicted that the collusion of dominant
classes in the First and Third World would retard the growth
of civil society, perpetuate underdevelopment, and foster
exclusionary regimes with powerful militaries
According to Theotonio Dos Santos' much- cited
definition, dependence is:
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While dependency theory can be seen as reaction to
modernization theory, it is important to realize that
dependency theory emerged from a long-standing tradition of
critical thought in Latin America. Dependency was "consumed"
by social science in the United States in a way that obscured
its Latin roots. "What had previously been an endeavor to be
critical and to maintain the continuity of previous
historical, economic, sociological, and political studies in
Latin America," explains Fernando Henrigue Cardoso, "was
transformed into an article for consumption in various
versions that include references to the original myth but in
large measure constitute the expression of a quite distinct
intellectual universe from that which it gave birth" (1977,
P-8) .
I recognize that the work done under the banner of
dependency theory is a disparate collection of work. It would
be misleading to lump all writers associated with the
dependency approach together. What is a theory for some is
simply one of many factors for another. My purpose is simply
to identify the main currents and propositions of the
approach
.
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As stated previously, dependency theory does not deal
explicitly with the military. it is an economic explanation
of the Third World's underdevelopment and exploitation.
Dependent countries are often characterized by the existence
of repressive, exclusionary military institutions and thus
discussion of the military as an agent of repression is a
major theme in the literature, but is generally not a primary
subject. Because the emphasis of much of the dependence
literature was on local and foreign elites, state actors such
as the military receive only scant attention. Dependency has
been used to explain a country's lack of development and the
military is dealt with by extrapolation (Phillip, 1985)
.
The most central structure to the paradigm is a world
capitalist economy that is divided into a developed core and
underdeveloped periphery. Discussing the dynamics of a
country in these systemic terms tends to obscure the role of
the state. A more direct examination of the state in
dependent countries makes it possible to discuss the role of
the military more directly.
Peter Evans states, "the tendency to concentrate on the
interaction of foreign capital with local private elites that
characterized earlier dependency work has clearly been
superseded. Not only is interest growing in relations between
the state and subordinate groups, but divisions within the
working class.... and conflicts within the state
apparatus .... are being examined as well" (1985, pp. 158-159).
19
Nora Hamilton, writing on the state in post-revolutionary
Mexico, addresses the important and often overlooked role of
the state in dependency theory. she states,
-from this
perspective, [classic dependence]
,
internal classes and forces
within the dependent country, including the state, have
limited importance in shaping the development of these
countries" (1982, p.16). Certainly state functions such as
taxation, law-making, and coercion have a more significant
effect on a polity's development than early versions of
dependency would allow. Hamilton explains further:
....control of the means of coercion would appear to
.
state
.
autonomy. At the same time, thedifferent historical origins of state institutions andtheir interaction with different classes and class
segments suggest that the interests pursued by theseinstitutions may be contradictory to each other as well
as to the government ( 1982
,
p.7).
Th® tensions between the state and its coercive apparatus
are crucial in determining state cohesion and determining the
outcome of divisions within the state. A more complete
description of situations of dependency must account for the
role of the state, its relative autonomy, and specify conflict
within the state apparatus.
The power of the dependency approach may be judged by the
ongoing criticism and debate that surrounds it (Evans, 1985)
.
The intellectual activity generated by dependency is
undeniable. Theorists working within and without the
dependency tradition continue to refine and redefine the
20
issues surrounding the impact of capitalism in countries of
the Third World.
One of the most powerful theories to emerge from the wake
of dependency theories is the bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA)
model developed by Guillermo O'Donnell (1973; 1978; 1979 ). No
recent paradigm has offered a more systematic explanation of
the emergence and function of authoritarian regimes and
militarism than the BA model. The effect of the BA literature
on the understanding of the Latin American military has been
great, but is not within the scope of this thesis (O'Donnell,
1973; Cardoso, 1973; Collier, 1979). For many reasons, the
BA model is too region-specific and thus not applicable to the
subject matter considered here—the Salvadoran military.
The bureaucrat ic—authoritar ian model is generally applied
to countries of South America that have experienced a period
of socialist or populist government for which authoritarianism
is the response. Bureaucratic-authoritarianism links military
rule to dependent capitalism: high-levels of modernization and
the exhaustion of the "easy stage" of import substitution
create a burgeoning popular sector which in turn engenders
military repression as a tool of dominant-class cohesion
(Remmer, 1989) . BA states like Argentina or Brazil are also
differentiated from Central American ones by the relatively
limited role played by the United States.
The situation described by the bureaucratic-authoritarian
model appears similar to conditions in El Salvador. El
21
Salvador was an exclusionary, military regime that engaged in
the suppression of popular interests. The emergence of this
system, however, coincided with an economic downturn in 1931
.
El Salvador never reached the level of modernization described
in bureaucratic-authoritarianism. As authoritarian states were
rising throughout the Southern cone in the 1960s and 1970s,
the military governments in El Salvador were continuing their
experiments in the twin policy of repression backed by reform.
The bureaucrat ic—author itar ian model is an effective means of
describing the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the
Southern cone/ it is essentially a theory about regime
transition. While I am concerned with the origins of military
rule in El Salvador, my emphasis is on its function and
impact. For these reasons, and others, the BA model is not
applicable to the case of El Salvador and its military.
Contemporary dependency theories have expanded their
analyses to incorporate the interaction of the so-called
"triple alliance"—foreign economic elites, domestic economic
elites, and various state actors (Evans, 1979) . With the
evolution of the paradigm, the role of the military can be
addressed more directly. Where once the military was
portrayed as a rather inert force subservient to the needs of
foreign capital, the greater emphasis on the state affords the
military a more active role as a political actor in its own
right, but is essentially portrayed as serving the needs of
the dominant classes. Based on these broad remarks, it is
22
possible to draw-out some of the main issues and questions
surrounding the military and dependency theory.
The military
,
as the coercive apparatus of the state, is
ultimately dependent on the world capitalist economy. The
state in a dependent country, by definition, lacks autonomy.
Although the military may rise to a role of prominence, their
status is directly related to a country's economic needs. The
military owes its existence to the dominant classes. Thus the
military's behavior is explained by examining the needs of
capital. And in a dependent country these needs are
stability, cheap labor, access to resources, and a positive
investment climate. As the agent of capital, albeit indirect,
the military provides these needs. Political arrangements
necessarily reflect or express the changing economic forces at
work in and on dependent societies (Fagen, 1977)
.
The ideology of the military, according to dependency
theory, is such that political tranquility is presumed to be
a prerequisite for economic development (Mason and Krane,
1989) . Hence, the military, in order to insure the
maintenance of conditions deemed appropriate for economic
development, responds with violence to opposition and dissent.
As will be shown, the Salvadoran military cannot be fully
described by relying on an economic explanation like
dependency. Even affording the military the status of a state
actor with some autonomy, as contemporary versions of
dependency do, cannot account for all of the military's
23
behavior. Hamilton states that, "the fact that state
institutions [i.e. the military] may have an underlying
integrity and logic of their own, or that those who control
the state apparatus are pursuing their own specific interests
are not problematic for Marxist theory so long as state
interests do not conflict with dominant class interests..."
(1982, P • 12 ) . As I will make clear in the historical section,
the Salvadoran military did pursue interests at odds with the
country's economic elites. Dependency theory is an effective
place to begin an understanding of the military in a dependent
country, but we must move beyond economically-based
explanations if the Salvadoran military is to be more fully
understood
.
Cultural Explanations
Clyde Kluckhohn, an early proponent of a cultural approach to
political phenomena, offered a definition of culture that has
been widely accepted:
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of
and for behavior acquired and transmitted by
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of
human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts;
the essential core of culture consists of traditional
(i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and
especially their attached values; culture systems may, on
the one hand, be considered as products of action, on
the other as conditioning influences upon
further action (Chilcote, 1981)
.
Gabriel Almond, another early advocate of culturally-
based analyses, suggested that political culture had a degree
of autonomy and yet was related to a society's general
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culture. Political culture, he maintained, did not coincide
with the political systems because participation in politics
transcends the boundaries of the political system. [Yet]
"every political system," Almond stated, "is embedded in a
particular pattern of orientations to political action. I
have found it useful to refer to this as the political
culture" (Chilcote
, 1981) . in Latin America, this "pattern of
orientation" has been defined by some as the so-called Iberian
legacy. In the following section I will sketch out the
rudiments of the theory I will refer to as corporatism as it
relates to military behavior.
Corporatism
Before beginning I must comment on the relevancy of
corporatism to the study of Latin American politics. I will
not evaluate the utility of the theories presented here until
chapter five, yet it is necessary to make a couple of initial
remarks
.
In the 1970s, the corporatist perspective enjoyed wide
popularity. Howard Wiarda, one of its principle proponents
remarked, "corporatism and corporatist models have achieved a
certain 'in-ness' of late which needs to be kept in
perspective" (Pike and Stritch, 1974) . Today, the opposite is
true. Corporatism has fallen out of favor. Divergent
historical developments such as the rise of democratic regimes
in all but a few Latin American countries seem to have
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undermined the fundamental premises of the model (Rouquie,
1987). To many, the various corporatist models are simply
outdated and reactionary means of description that offer
little explanatory or predictive value.
While I do not expect corporatism to offer complete
utility, I do not think it is possible to dispense with it all
together either. As an answer to critics who would like to
toss out the corporatist model with Ptolemy's theory of the
universe, Wiarda offers a sobering rejoinder. "Most of Latin
America is still only partially democratic, or else, as in
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and other countries, there
are two power structures, one democratic and one
authoritarian, still coexisting uneasily side by side. The
liberal-pluralist framework may help explain one of those
power structures, but we still need the corporatist—
authoritarian model to explain the other one" (1992, p.335).
I believe the model can be of some use in helping to explain
military phenomena in El Salvador and is therefore useful to
examine here.
There are several strands of corporatism. With a
concentration on the work of Wiarda and others, who emphasize
the weight of the Iberian legacy in Latin America, I will
relate it to an explanation of military behavior in Latin
America, and then briefly discuss the contributions of
Schmitter and Stepan, who place less emphasis on the cultural
antecedents of corporatist behavior.
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Proponents of the Iberian legacy emphasize the effect of
Latin America's past and cultural traditions. They argue that
there is a distinct tradition in the region that predisposes
government and society to social and political forms all
together different from Western traditions of pluralism,
democracy, and individualism. This body of theory states that
Spain and Portugal's collective experiences with Roman law,
the wars of Reconquest against the Spanish Moors, Catholicism,
and monarchism have imparted on the countries of Latin America
a distinct cultural tradition (Pike and Stritch, 1974; wiarda,
1974; Malloy, 1977; Davies and Loveman, 1978; Dealy, 1988).
These theories emphasize the need for an "alternative"
understanding of the region's social, political, and economic
development based on an appreciation of its strong cultural
legacies
.
Howard Wiarda explains:
Employed in its historic and cultural sense, corporatism
refers to a system based on a belief in or acceptance of
a natural hierarchy of social or functional groups,
each with its place in the social order and with its
own rights and obligations ...( 1992
,
p. 324).
This is a useful definition in that it incorporates many
of the various themes that run throughout the literature:
organicism, hierarchy, and state control. It is necessary,
however, to draw out two subtypes of corporatism that are
implicit in Wiarda 's definition: state corporatism and
societal corporatism. Phillippe Schmitter offers a second
version of corporatism and makes this distinction more clear.
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Schmitter distances himself from the majority of
corporatist writers. His staring point is to treat
corporatism from the viewpoint of the institutional
characteristics of interest group representation. Schmitter
defines it as a system "in which the constituent units are
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory,
noncompetive, heirarchially ordered and functionally
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not
created) by the state..." (1973, pp. 93-94). Unlike the Iberian
Legacy, he places less emphasis on the cultural influences of
corporatism and instead links corporatism to the emergence of
industrialization in the Third World. Further, Schmitter
points to corporatist structures in Africa and northern Europe
and thus does not find it to be unigue to the Iberian world
(Schmitter, 1974) . From these distinctions come two subtypes
of corporatism.
According to Schmitter, state corporatism is associated
with political systems in which territorial sub-units are
tightly subordinated to central state power; elections are
non-existent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or
monopolized by a weak single party, executive authorities are
ideologically exclusive such that political sub-cultures based
on class, ethnicity, language or regionism are repressed.
Examples of state corporatism are Spain under Franco, the
Estado Novo in Brazil, and Chile under Pinochet.
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societal corporatism, on the other hand, refers to a more
autonomous and democratic system. Societal corporatism is
found in advanced capitalist countries such as Switzerland,
Denmark, and the Netherlands. It is characterized by open
electoral processes and party systems, an ideologically varied
and coalitionally-based executive, and a highly "layered" or
"pillared" political sub-culture (Schmitter, 1974 ) .
in Latin America, it is clear that state corporatism has
existed almost exclusively. it is erroneous, however, to
equate corporatism with right-wing, reactionary regimes.
Left-leaning regimes such as Velasco in Peru, Castro's Cuba,
and Panama under Torrijos all promoted inclusionary programs
of populism and economic redistribution, and yet demonstrated
corporate characteristics of clientelism, cooptation, and
hierarchy
.
It is possible to add a third type of corporatism to the
versions propounded by Wiarda and Schmitter. In The State and
Society
,
Stepan presents the organic-statist model as an
important but often neglected model of social and political
behavior. It is "organic" because it refers to a normative
vision of the political community in which the components
combine to enable the full development of a society's
potential. It is "statist" in that organizing such a society
requires power, rational choices, and decision-making. An
organic-statist society does not occur spontaneously, it needs
to be created (Stepan, 1978). The starting point of this
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approach is a normative one that states the preferred form of
political life is man as a member of a community. it is the
state that orders society and provides this "organic unity."
Unlike proponents of the Iberian legacy who trace the
reverence for order and unity to Spain and Portugal, Stepan
sites a much more ancient tradition. Organic-statism "has
been a dominant strand of political thought since the time of
Aristotle ... this approach is very much alive as a
philosophical and structural approach, especially in southern
Europe and Latin America" (1978, p.27).
Although Schmitter and Stepan's contributions are
important ones, I have chosen to focus on the Iberian Legacy
as discussed by Wiarda and others. This form of corporatism
is employed specifically to describe Latin society while the
others are more broad. The belief that there is something
the nations of Latin America that predisposes them
toward authoritarianism seems to be a strong, although often
unstated belief. "In Latin American minds," Glen Caudill
Dealy explains, "the vision of freely competing factions all
too often seems a choice between chaos and privilege ... Latinos
maintain that union comes from unity, not diversity—Ex unibus
unum
,
not E pluribus unum, has been and still is their motto
(1988, p . 7 ) . I think it is important to see how far this
approach gets us to understanding the Salvadoran military.
The military, perhaps more than any other institution,
epitomizes the values and traditions of the Iberian legacy.
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It is an institution built on a foundation of discipline,
hierarchy, power, and order. Crudely put, the military's
behavior in Latin America is explained by corporatist theory
as the product of the institution's reverence for the
aforementioned traditions. Coups, military dictatorship, and
repression are common phenomena in Latin America because they
are "normal." it is only because we perceive the world
through pluralist lenses that such occurrences are seen as
aberrant. How do we explain the US military's apolitical role
and subservience to civilian authority? A culturally—based
answer would reply that it is the United States' collective
traditions of freedom, democracy, and fear of despotism that
reigns in the military.
In the corporatist model, the military plays a strong and
political role because its organic mission is to maintain
order and stability. Perhaps the military's role is better
defined not as political, but anti-political. The military in
Latin America, it is claimed, intervenes in political and
social affairs in reaction to the divisive and corrupting
influence of politicians, politics, and pluralist democracy in
general. To the military, democracy is a dangerous
enterprise. It entails tolerance of the opposition,
constitutional restraints on authority, the mobilization of
urban and rural poor, demands for income redistribution, and
above all uncertainty. Democracy, then, is seen by the
military as antithetical to Iberian values of hierarchy,
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authoritarianism, elitism, and gradualism. Davies and Loveman
describe this as the "politics of antipolitics:"
Polit ics, including the demagogic appeals by
civilian politicians to the emerging proletariat,promoted class conflict and instability which "forced'sectors of the military to intervene to restore order
??QDQ
Clean
o
S
,
e thS b°dY politic of Political corruption(iyoo, p . 3 )
.
To summarize, the corporatist model explains the
omnipresent role of the military in Latin America by pointing
to the regions 's cultural traditions. The military embodies
the Ibero traditions of hierarchy, elitism, unity, and a
reverence for order and stability. According to the model,
military-led coups and the repression of dissent should be
seen as "normal" and not the sign of a deformed society.
The military in Latin America is seen in corporatist
theory as the product of society, for the military embodies
many Iberian ideals. Of course Latin America has undergone
countless changes since the arrival of the conquistadors.
Despite corporatist theory's grounding in tradition,
corporatist societies are not immutable. The competing models
of pluralism and socialism continually exert pressure on
corporate structures. Although writers assign different
weight to the impact of these forces, none states that a
corporatist society is static. Change occurs, albeit
incrementally. The military in a corporate society does not
simply repress or eliminate all opposition. The corporatist
model emphasizes the ability of the military and other
powerful groups to absorb and coopt potential threats to the
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established order (Wiarda, 1982 and 1992). a small,
unorganized union may be easy to marginalize or eliminate, for
example, but a larger, mass-based group such as the National
Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENESTRAS) is not as easily
squashed. Recognizing the strength of such a movement, the
military seeks to coopt it rather than to destroy it outright.
Change in a corporatist system may take seemingly radical
forms. The military-led revolution in Peru of 1968 is an
example. Stepan explains in The State and Society that in
this tradition of corporatist thought, "despite the concern
for stability, there is a justification for rapid structural
change and for a strong state that can impose this change"
(1978, p.34). Thus events of 1968 can be seen through the
corporatist optic as an effort to restore a sense of the
"common good" to Peru and put society's components back in
their proper place.
The Salvadoran military displays much of the behavior
predicted by corporatist theory: the need to maintain order,
a reverence for hierarchy, and authoritarianism. I will show
in the historical section of this thesis that the Salvadoran
military has been influenced by more than one set of cultural
traditions and has acted in ways that the Iberian legacy
cannot account for. As with dependency theory, corporatism
can offer only a partial explanation of the military's
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behavior because it is limited to an essentialized set of
influences
.
Political Explanations
A political explanation of military behavior begins from
the proposition that it is a dynamic organization with
interests and goals of its own. Instead of giving primacy to
economic or cultural factors, political explanations of
military behavior emphasize the porous nature of the military
institution. In the following pages, I will describe how the
military is explained in political terms and show what authors
employing this approach have done. Such a position, it must
be said, is under-represented in the literature on Latin
America' a militaries. Augusto Vargas explains:
Although the military has had an important political role
in Latin American societies, few scholars have devoted
much effort to this phenomena.
. .few studies have focused
on the specific ways in which military institutions
become intertwined with the rest of the state apparatus,
the economy, and society (1989, p.vi).
Despite the small number of politically-based accounts of
the military it is possible to sketch out the rudiments of
such an approach.
The military in Latin America is influenced by a number
of actors and forces within and outside of society. This may
seem rather axiomatic, but the military in Latin America has
often been regarded as either apolitical or isolated from the
events and pressures civil society (Stepan, 1988) . In the
course of the twentieth century, the military has emerged as
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an independent variable that must be taken into account in
analyses of Latin America's political development (Vargas,
1989)
. Stepan offers a succinct agenda for a political
approach to the military:
...to study the role of the Brazilian or any other army
adequately, one cannot proceed from the proposition thatthe army, because of its mission and organization, is
exclusively a nationally-oriented and unified
organization. Instead .... there is a constant need to
evaluate military institutional characteristics withinthe larger framework of the overall political system(1971, p. 20)
.
Stepan presents a schematic of society in which the
military acts and is acted upon. He divides society into
three polity arenas: civil society, political society, and the
state
.
Civil society is defined as all social groups and
organizations such as unions, student groups, and professional
associations. Political society is the area in which the
polity arranges itself for political contestation. This area
is made up of political parties, the legislature, and the
electoral process. Finally, the state is conceived as
"something more than government." Stepan defines it in
Weberian terms as the continuous administrative, legal,
bureaucratic, and coercive system that attempts not only to
manage the state apparatus, but to structure relations between
civil and public power and within civil and political society.
In an authoritarian or military regime, the state eliminates
or absorbs the autonomy of civil and political society (1988,
p.3-4)
.
Stepan's contribution to understanding the military's
35
this
behavior is his argument to "rethink" its role within
polity arena.
In Rethinking Military Politics
,
Stepan investigates the
important part played by various components of the nations 's
military in Brazil's redemocratization. Most of the
literature on Brazil's transition from authoritarian rule
focuses on civil society's opposition to the state. civil
society has been treated as "the political celebrity of the
abertura ." This unidirectional perspective, Stepan explains,
has led to a neglect not only of inter-and intra-class
linkages, but also to a neglect of the internal contradictions
within the military apparatus that led it to seek out allies
within civil society (1988, p.7).
These contradictions, brought on by the growing autonomy
of the National Information Service (SNI)
,
precipitated
Brazil's transition. By treating the military as a complex
and diverse organization—a political actor—Stepan has
contributed to an understanding of the military's role in
Brazil's transition. The need to re-examine the military
involves its role in the three polity arenas. The Brazilian
military influenced and was influenced by members of all three
arenas. The fissures within the military reveal an important
point: power is a relationship. It is held or exercised in
relation to other political actors. As the interaction among
and within the three polity arenas changes, so does the
political landscape.
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The current era of democratization throughout much of
Latin America necessitates an understanding of the political
behavior of the armed forces. "One of the difficulties
civilian governments are experiencing in controlling 'their'
militaries," Vargas states, "largely derives from
institutional changes within the armed forces
themselves.
. .these changes have generated strong demands
within the military to impose their definition of the national
interest (1989, p.6). A political explanation of the
military examines the nature of interest articulation and
institutional changes within the military.
The military's autonomy is a principle point of entry in
a discussion of its political behavior. It is a particularly
salient issue for nations that are attempting to redefine
civil-military relations in the wake of democratization.
David Pion-Berlin, another proponent of a politically-centered
approach, offers a careful treatment of military autonomy. He
sees to kinds of autonomy, institutional and political.
Institutional autonomy refers to the military's
professional independence and exclusivity. In the interests
of its own professional development, the armed forces asserts
its corporate autonomy and consciousness that sets it away
from lay institutions. This definition of autonomy can simply
be called professionalism. Political autonomy, on the other
hand, refers to the military's aversion to civilian control.
Although the military is part of the state, the military acts
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as if it were above and beyond the authority of the
government. "The degree of political autonomy," Pion-Berlin
explains, "is a measure of the military's determination to
strip civilians of their political prerogatives and claim
these for itself" (1992, p.84-85). There are several
implications of those two definitions.
Growth in military autonomy is not necessarily a threat
to a civilian regime. An institutionally autonomous military
may actually be desirable in a democratic setting because a
professional military is likely to be less susceptible to
internal conflict and prey to external influences. Further,
military's long-associated with authoritarian rule such as
those in Argentina, Uruguay and El Salvador, may find within
institutional autonomy a means to coexist with civilian
authorities
. Rather than intending to weaken civilian
governments, the military may simply express a desire for
self-governing autonomy and isolation within a civilian
government (Pion-Berlin, 1992)
.
A more thorough description of military autonomy allows
for differences in the expression of military power. "If we
accept that there are professional and political dimensions to
autonomy," states Pion-Berlin, "then any empirical
investigation must be sensitive to the variance with which
military power expresses itself" (1992, p. 87). Military
behavior is better understood if conceived along a
profess ional-political continuum.
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Pion-Berlin examined the relative institutional and
political autonomy of the military in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Uruguay, and Peru during the recent period of regime
transition. He focused on several decision-sites. These are
senior and junior level personnel decisions, force levels,
military education, doctrine, reform, budgets, arms
procurements and production, defense organization,
intelligence gathering, internal security, and human rights.
These areas represent points of contention between civil and
military authorities as well as between the military itself.
Pion-Berlin found that military autonomy is far from uniform.
It varied from country to country and by issue area. The
armed forces seemed to exercise greatest control over a set of
core interests that are at the heart of institutional
autonomy. These are education, military doctrine, and issues
of reform (Pion-Berlin, 1992).
Military power is neither limitless or uniform. "There
seems to be," Pion-Berlin states, "a ceiling to power above
which the armed forces prefer not to go or can not go and
below which they desire to extend their influence" within the
political order (1992, p.99). An understanding of these
differences in military autonomy provides an insight into the
extent of its power. In the delicate area of civilian-
military relations, a recognition of what are "core" military
interests and what are "peripheral" may foster a better
understanding of how to structure relations between the
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military and other interest groups in newly democratic
polities
.
The central proposition of political explanations of
military behavior is that it is necessary to look both outside
and within the military institution to fully understand its
motivations and actions. within the political system are a
number of forces that act upon the armed forces. How a
particular military will respond to these external forces are
dependent upon the internal dynamics of the military itself.
Samuel Fitch, examined the political role played by the
Ecuadoran armed forces and developed a useful guideline for
explaining military intervention in politics. Fitch wrote
specifically about military coups which can be seen as the
ultimate expression political behavior by the military.
Ideally, the military functions to defend the government, not
to overthrow it. Fitch identifies four factors that help to
understand the military's behavior.
First, it is necessary to specify the decision criteria
by which the armed forces judge whether a particular
government should be supported or overthrown. "Only by
specifying these decision criteria and, through them, the
changing political scene to which the military responds,"
Fitch explains, "can we explain why armies do what they do."
Second, it is necessary to indicate what determines which
political outcomes are deemed relevant to a decision to
overthrow the government. What political outcomes are
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desirable and what ones constitute a threat? Third, is the
need to specify the military's attitudes toward the political
role of the armed forces in a crisis situation. Fourth and
finally, is the need to identify the determinants of political
outcomes that are seen as relevant to the military's decision
to launch a coup or other type of political intervention
(1977
, pp. 2-6) .
Politically-centered efforts to explain military behavior
are unified by the assertion that the armed forces, like labor
unions, economic elites, and civilian politicians, are
political actors in their own right. The challenge of this
kind of approach is to open the "black box" of military
behavior. One of the central guestions that emerge from this
undertaking is the issue of the military's autonomy vis-a-vis
other political actors. What restraints are placed on the
military and, conversely, what restraints does the military
place on other interest groups? Much work remains to be done
on how the military's own internal logic is formed, how is its
ideology created, and why it changes.
The military is an interest group that does not fall
neatly under the heading of "state actor." The military may
have interests and goals often wholly at odds with those of
other components of the state. As Stepan states, "the ideal
type of military institution—a highly unified organization
with a private code and values, isolated from the general
pressures of the political system at large—often simply does
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not exist" (1971, P* 56)
.
Many writers who advocate political
explanations of the military's behavior reject simply adding
a military dimension to an over-arching "theory of the state"
(Philip, 1985; Stepan, 1988). "As the recent literature on
the state has reminded us," Remmer says, "state actors may
pursue goals, interests, and activities that are not readily
reducible to those of the middle class, oligarchy, or other
set of social interests
... the armed forces may be seen as
having concerns that potentially differ from the bourgeoisie
as a whole" (1989, p.33).
If the military as a political actor cannot be explained
simply as a component of the state, where does its motivation
and ultimate loyalty come from? Where do state and military
interests diverge? There can be no single answer to this
guestions, but a political approach to the military seeks to
answer them by examining the particular set of influences,
interests, and goals that surround the armed forces. Remmer
states that "the analysis of military rule conseguently should
be predisposed on the assumption that the answer to variations
among authoritarian regime are to be found in the dynamic
interaction between social class forces and state
institutions" (1989, p.32). A political account of the
military allows for a fuller description of its behavior.
42
CHAPTER 2
FORMATION AND THE RISE OF PERSONAL RULE
(1823-1944)
An investigation into the formation and evolution of the
various branches of the Salvadoran military necessarily leads
to a discussion of Salvadoran history itself, for the history
of the institution and the country are integrally related. In
its participation in politics and government, and through its
relations with various domestic and external actors, the
military has had a profound effect on the country. in the
proceding chapters I will present a history of the Salvadoran
military that will hopefully illuminate the complexity and
dynamism of the institution.
A certain structure emerges when observing the military
over time. The history of the Salvadoran armed forces is best
understood by observing a number of themes that run through
the institution's history. These are the recurrence of
repression and reform in the face of crises and unrest,
political intervention by the juventud militar
,
and its
perennially unprofessional behavior. The Gramscian terms
"passive revolution" and "organic crisis" will be presented as
a means of explaining events in El Salvador and the military's
response. 3 Above all, I argue that the history of the
3 Here I borrow from Robert Fatton, Jr., "Gramsci and the
Legitimation of the State: The Case of the Senegalese Passive
Revolution:" Canadian Journal of Political Science, XIX: 4 (December
1986)
,
729-750 and John Girling, "Thailand in Gramscian
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Salvadoran military shows it to be a political actor with an
internal logic of its own. Where it once did the bidding of
the country's elite, the military developed into a complex,
factionalized organization that pursued its own interests.
In the following pages I will attempt to bring out
aspects and themes of the military that are not adequately
explained in the competing paradigms presented above, to
answer some of the questions I posed in the introduction, and
to try to show the complex and often contradictory behavior of
the Salvadoran military.
Of course, imposing such structures on the history of the
military can only be done with the benefit of hindsight. As
Frank Graziano states in his analysis of the "dirty war" in
Argentina, "history is lived forward but read backwards"
(1992, P • 4 ) . Graziano prefaces his work on the Argentine
military with a frank admission of the writer's privileged and
biased position that is involved in any attempt to construct
a historical narrative. Graziano explains:
the unlikelihood that the world would present itself in
coherent stories endowed naturally with central subjects,
highly organized plot structures, thematic integrity, and
Perspective," Padfic Affairs
,
v57 (Fall 1984), 385-403.
Both authors argue for the application of a Gramscian
approach to the Third World. I believe that it fits El Salvador
particularly well. Girling states: "Like Gramsci's Italy, the
latter [the Third World] are developing from traditional or mixed
society's into modern industrialized ones. In both early
twentieth-century Italy and in the present-day Third World we find
the dichotomy of industrial and agrarian sectors; the ambiguity of
the peasantry, conservatively attached to the ownership of land but
capable of becoming a revolutionary force if deprived of it...",
p.386.
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moralizable conclusions thus fosters the realization thathistorical events that seem to 'tell themselves 'areactually authored constructs with distended and complexconnections to their sources of production (1992, p
2**
I find this point especially relevant to El Salvador. As
discussed in the introduction, many observers of recent events
m that country see the end of authoritarian rule and a
transition to democracy. These political developments are
often portrayed as the product of El Salvador's inexorable
progression toward democracy. Enrique Baloyra, an astute
observer of Salvadoran affairs, states "contemporary
Salvadoran politics reveals a process of political transition
that may lead to democratization
.... resulting in the
installation of a popularly elected government committed to
inaugurate a democratic regime" (1986, p.125). While a move
to democracy may or may not occur, regarding the history of El
Salvador as one moving inevitably toward democracy seems to be
an act of creating the kind of "moralizable conclusion"
described by Graziano. Salvadoran politics may indeed reveal
a transition to democracy, but other processes are also at
play. To say that Salvadoran history is "complex" may sound
a bit trite, but an explanation that emphasizes certain
elements of Salvadoran history at the expense of others will
most likely be too simple. The nature of political
developments in El Salvador are overdetermined and care must
be taken not to treat the country's history as some linear
progression to democracy.
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Overview
Since it became a sovereign republic in 1847, El Salvador
has been dominated by the complex and often conflictual
interplay of economic elites and the military. m general,
the military has dominated the official reigns of government
while the oligarchy has controlled economic affairs. This
system of military and oligarchic domination shaped the course
of Salvadoran history for more than one hundred years, it was
only in 1979, when a group of young, progressive officers
overthrew the government, that the system was brought to an
end. After 1979, El Salvador was governed by a number of
civilian-military juntas and in 1984, its first "civilian
democracy" was inaugurated. Of course, the period after 1979
^Iso marked the country's descent into a twelve—year civil war
which only recently was brought to an end.
Baloyra has broken the period before the coup of 1979
into three main eras: oligarchic republic (1870-1921),
personal military dictatorship (1932-1944), and institutional
military rule (1948-1979) (1982, p.3). After El Salvador
gained its independence from Spain and then from the Kingdom
of Guatemala, an entrepreneurial class of agricultural elites
emerged. When the cultivation of El Salvador's single export
crop— indigo—was rendered obsolete by the development of a
synthetic form of the dye, El Salvador's economy switched to
a far more profitable crop—coffee. The rise of a new coffee
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elite ushered in the oligarchic republic. This was a regime
run by a small group of economic actors who controlled the
market, derived social prominence from it, and acquired
unchecked political influence.
The world-wide depression in the early 30 's brought
coffee prices to all-time lows and threw the oligarchy into a
profound crisis. Declining demand for coffee abroad and
increasing labor unrest in the Salvadoran countryside brought
the oligarchic republic to an end. After internal differences
were resolved, an increasingly active military took formal
political control of the country in 1932. The reigns of
government passed from the oligarchy to the military. While
the military gained de jure control of the state apparatus,
economic elites continued to wield a considerable amount of
power. The military, in the form of personal dictatorship and
then institutional rule, dominated the course of events in El
Salvador for the next fifty years (Baloyra, 1982) . To fully
comprehend the military's rise to power and its role today, it
is necessary to begin with an examination of the oligarchic
republic from which the armed forces emerged.
Formation
The military and security forces in El Salvador all trace
their roots back to the beginnings of export agriculture and
the intense pressure for the commercial utilization of land
created by the "coffee boom" in the late 1850s. The so-called
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"bourgeois revolution" in 1870 brought with it a change in the
means of production in El Salvador and a newly dominant social
class. The cultivation of coffee modernized the economy and
led to the emergence of a preindustrial state. "Liberals"
interested in export agriculture and economic expansion, soon
eclipsed the more traditional "conservatives," represented by
latifundistas and members of the Catholic church.
Baloyra explains that "concentration and coerced labor
enabled the coffee cultivators to accumulate capital rather
quickly
,
to wield tremendous amounts of political influence,
and eventually to become hegemonic" (1983, p.299). The
government that developed in El Salvador was oligarchic
because it recruited its leaders from a narrow social stratum
which can be identified with two or three families: Araujo,
Melendez, and Quinonez Molina (Baloyra, 1982).
Communal and ejidal lands, once viewed as unproductive by
indigo growers, were suddenly seized by coffee planters who
recognized the value of the volcanically enriched soil.
Coffee grows best at elevations over 1,500 feet, but much of
the land at this elevation was owned communally by campesino
and indigenous communities. The state solved the problem by
instituting a number of decrees which abolished collective
property. Soon the land was consolidated into private hands.
The process of expropriation engendered a great deal of
resistance and violence in the countryside. James Dunkerly
states that because of the reaction of the newly dispossessed
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Salvadorans, "it rapidly proved necessary to pass vagrancy
laws and set up a regular army precisely to control this mass
of landless workers and counteract the wave of squatting,
crop-burning and theft to which it made recourse in its
plight" (1982, P* 12) . Thus, the Salvadoran army was born out
of the agricultural elite's need for vast amounts of land.
The oligarchy's need for land produced unrest in the
countryside which in turn created the need for a military to
repress it. This rather ironic phenomena was to characterize
Salvadoran life for decades to come.
Before the formation of official agencies of coercion,
the task of dealing with rebellious peasants was carried out
by landowners themselves and their private armies. As the
need for a more organized force grew, elements of these
private groups were formed into the rural police (1884) and
the mounted police (1889) . Later, these organizations evolved
into the National Guard in 1912 and the Treasury Police in
1936 (Montgomery, 1982).
First constituted in 1824 by General Manuel Arce, the
Salvadoran army, technically a force of external security, was
more often deployed to quell internal unrest (Blutstein et al,
1971) . In an effort to professionalize the army, the
Salvadoran government recruited a number of foreign military
officials to train their troops. First, several French
officers were brought in to train the army. In 1901,
President Tomas Regaldo hired a Chilean military mission to
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instruct Salvadoran forces. Later in 1912, a Spanish civil
Guard officer was invited to aid in the formation of the
country national guard. In the 1960s under the Alliance for
Progress and during the 1980s as well, the US played a
prominent role in the training of Salvadoran troops (Arnson,
1982) .
Here parallels can be made with the development of South
American armies. El Salvador was one of the few Central
American countries to receive substantial military training
from Europe. These missions were intended to create a
disciplined, bureaucratic, hierarchical, and above all
apolitical military. This is what is meant by a "professional
military." in Yesterday's Soldiers
,
Frederick Nunn argues
that the European military training missions in Latin America
actually led to a greater propensity within the military to
involve itself in politics and eschew civilian authority. The
result was a rejection not just of partisan politics but of
the political process itself. South American officers
reflected the traditional European disdain for civilians and
a distinct wariness of civilian democracy (Nunn, 1983). The
impact of the European trainers seems to have been similar in
El Salvador.
The number of foreign influences brought to bear on the
Salvadoran military demonstrates the inadequacy of mono-
cultural explanations such as the Iberian legacy. The fact
that the same Salvadoran military can goose-step in tight
50
formation, argue for organic unity, and swear allegiance to
constitutional democracy reveals a patchwork of influences not
easily stereotyped.
Up until the 1930s, the Salvadoran military was largely
subservient to the needs of the oligarchy. The relationship
between these two groups, however, was symbiotic. The
military assured El Salvador's elite access to land and cheap
labor while the oligarchy helped the military to rise to a
position of prominence in society and allowed many officers to
use the government to line their pockets.
The early years of the republic were characterized by
instability and dozens of coups d'etat. Between 1850 and
1900, there were 47 heads of state, only 5 of whom completed
their full term (Dunkerly, 1982) . Such disorder continued
into the twentieth century but with much less frequency.
Dunkerly explains that with increasing coffee revenues, the
military received a fifth of the national budget and state
employment reached the highest level in Central America. This
expansion of the state led to monopolization of government by
the Melendez-Quinonez clan.
From 1913 until 1931 members of these families dominated
the political landscape. "The manner in which the oligarchy
accumulated it fabulous wealth," Dunkerly says, "was totally
reliant upon the constant expansion of the world economy and
strict containment of domestic class conflict" (1982, p.14).
By the end of the 1920s neither of these conditions existed.
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In the face of a crisis within the oligarchy, the military
stepped into the political spotlight, and arguably, has never
left.
Although not a member of the Melendez-Quinonez clan, Pio
Romero Bosque was placed into government by the family. Soon
after he assumed office, however, he distanced himself from
the oligarchy's tradition of exclusionary rule by speaking of
the need for social reform. Romero Bosque was a political and
economic conservative who alternatively tried to conciliate
and repress the masses. Although his efforts at reform were
relatively timid, he contributed to all-ready growing social
and political unrest. He distinguished himself by presiding
over El Salvador's first truly democratic election in 1931,
marking a sharp break from the Melendez-Quinonez tradition of
appointing its successors.
The overwhelming winner of these elections was Arturo
Araujo. Araujo took power at a particularly turbulent time in
Salvadoran history. The economic crash of 1929 forced many
coffee producers to let their crops rot in the field as prices
fell sharply. Relatedly, the fall of coffee prices
contributed to growing unrest in the countryside and the
development of leftist political groups. Unions and political
organizations like the Federacion Regional de Trabajadores de
El Salvador (FRTS)
,
Socorro Rojo International (SRI)
,
and the
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) put increasing pressure
on the new president for jobs, land, and income distribution.
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The militancy of these groups, coupled with the similarly
hostile attitude of many members of the elite who resented his
monetary policies, undermined Araujo's presidency from the
start (Anderson, 1992). Araujo could probally have endured
these pressures had he not fallen out of favor with the
military
,
who ultimately overthrew him.
During Araujo's nine-month long administration, the
payment of military salaries had fallen into arrears. A group
of young officers, protesting their lack of pay and the
general incompetence they saw in the government, set in motion
a coup that culminated in the installation of General
1 Hernandez Martinez to the presidency (Montgomery,
1982) . General Martinez 4 was Araujo's vice-president and
minister of war and is credited with helping Araujo win the
election. General Martinez' assumption of power was a
watershed event in the history of the armed forces and the
nation in general. The consequences of his twelve-year rule
are still felt today (Anderson, 1992; Shulz and Graham, 1984).
Martinez' rise to power marked the transference of the
oligarchy's domination of the government apparatus to the
military. The nature of this transference, however, is
subject to interpretation. Baloyra explains that when the
oligarchy was faced with rising pressure for land and labor
reform from below, they called upon actors within the military
4 The general is always referred to as General Martinez
instead of General Hernandez.
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to restore order through repression, in so doing, members of
the oligarchy traded their direct monopoly of the government
for the preservation of the system of export agriculture.
"Since the 1930s this form of domination has centered on a
very complex partnership between entrepreneurs linked to the
export sector and military officers seeking to neutralize or
at least delay the land and labor question and the overall
question of democracy" (1983, p.307)
.
in Baloyra's assessment
of these events, however, I see a problem that runs throughout
much of the writing on El Salvador.
Implicit in his statement is a denial, or at least a
failure to recognize, any military autonomy as an initiator of
action. He treats the military as if it were an inert
organization without any internal motivation or direction.
While it is true that the military and security forces of El
Salvador were constituted as the coercive arm of the coffee
elite, as the institution grew so did a sense of its mission
and perception of itself as a political actor. The genesis
and subsequent function of the military must be regarded as
separate phenomena
.
The oligarchy's interests were served by the installation
of Martinez, but I maintain the military's actions stem in
part from the institution's own goals and ideology. Anderson
doubts the existence of any conspiracy between economic elites
and their military henchmen (1992, p.78). Not only was the
government's failure to pay the military a factor, but some
54
weight must be given to the ideology of the young officers
involved in the coup. The Escuela Militar, the first military
academy in Central America, instilled in its cadets a certain
"constitutional" justification for the military's intervention
in political affairs when the "national will" was put in
jeopardy. Although much of the military's behavior was anti-
democratic, the military often attempted to legitimize its
behavior by claiming to be defending the Constitution. 5
Finally, the quasi-populist nature of some of Araujo's
policies gave rise to the specter of socialism that further
induced the military to act against the president (Grieb,
1970; Anderson, 1992)
.
Romero Bosque and Araujo's cautious attempts at reform
raised the expectations of increasingly agitated campesinos,
laborers, and students. Any possibility of reform and social
change were quickly dashed as General Martinez let loose one
of the most repressive reigns of terror the country had ever
seen. A poorly organized uprising of indigenous peoples and
campesinos in the western region of the country, instigated in
part by the Communist Party and other militant groups,
See the text of Salvadoran military proclamations in Brian
Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr., The Politics of Antipolitics .
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), pp. 271-86.
This kind of rhetorical deference to constitutional
legitimacy is not unique to El Salvador's military. Jennifer G.
Schirmer offers a similar discussion of the Guatemalan military's
references to the Constitution in "Rule of Law or Law of Rule."
Guatemalan Military Attitudes Toward Law, National Security and
Human Rights." (Unpublished paper presented to the New England
council on Latin American Studies Conference) (NECLAS)
,
October 22,
1988 .
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resulted in the massacre of some 10,000 Salvadorans at the
hands of the military/ La Matanza, as the event is known,
is regarded by many as the single most important event in the
country's Twentieth century history (Anderson, 1992; Schmidt,
1983; Dunkerly
,
1982)
. Three consequences in particular stand
out.
To begin with, La Matanza consolidated Martinez' control
of government and established a new division of labor within
that government. Harald Jung writes,
Th
?. Notary keP fc the office of president and thepolitically important ministries, while the key positionsin economic policy were filled by representatives of thebourgeoisie .... this division of functions between the
military and bourgeoisie continued right through to the1970s, and emerged intact from all government crises and
coups (1986, p. 69)
.
Next, in addition to this new modus vivendi, the armed
forces asserted their role as a political actor that would
intervene whenever crises arose. This set in motion a cycle
that characterized Salvadoran politics for years to come.
Faced with rising unrest, the military responded with
brutality to squash the turmoil from below. Then, after
"order" had been restored, the military initiated a series of
luke-warm reforms in the hope of preempting future outbreaks
of unrest. Not surprisingly, deep social problems returned to
the surface in the form of popular protest and organization
6 Many figures have been given as to total number killed
ranging from 1,000 to 50,000. Based on Charles Anderson's careful
research, 10,000 seems to be the most accurate number.
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( Shulz and Graham,
and was swiftly met with military reprisal
1984). The cycle then began anew.
General Martinez appears to have followed this cycle.
After the rural unrest was effectively eliminated and the
corpse-choked streets cleaned up, Martinez recognized the need
for some kind of reform. He assigned his minister of
gobernacion the task of addressing the needs of the
inhabitants of the western provinces, with this information,
Martinez set out to implement long-term reforms to avert
future crises (Anderson, 1992) . His efforts resulted in some
changes in public health and education (English, 1984). Most
of his policies, however, benefitted the coffee sector.
Finally, perhaps the most enduring legacy of La Matanza
was the fear that it etched onto the national psyche. For the
impoverished majority of El Salvador, the event served as a
reminder of the cost of rebellion. To the oligarchy and
members of the bourgeoisie, the event took on mythical
proportions. Because most of the evidence surrounding the
event was destroyed, the facts of the incident have been
altered and many Salvadorans came to believe that a great many
members of the upper and middle classes had been killed by the
rabid masses of campesinos and communists. In reality only a
hundred or more had been killed in the violence and most of
them were soldiers. The imagery of thousands of peasants
coming down from the hills to terrorize the countryside is
capitalized on by those who oppose greater enfranchisement and
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social
reform (North, 1982). Any party which advocates
justice, especially if its program involves change in the
agrarian sector, is met with the belief that such measures are
impossible in a small and overpopulated country like El
Salvador. "After all," Stephen Webre states sarcastically,
"[it is] only irresponsible Red deceit of the masses that
leads them to violence in the pursuit of such chimeras as
social and economic justice" (1979, p.9). And finally, La
Matanza demonstrated the extremes to which the military was
willing to go to maintain the status quo and its definition of
"order." The event foreshadowed the military's brutal
campaign against insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s.
General Martinez' government is accurately called a
^ itary dictatorship, but authority emanated from the man
rather than the institution. However, the military and
security forces were becoming increasingly organized and
institutionalized bodies in the early twentieth century. This
fact, coupled with the growing capriciousness of Martinez'
rule, led another group of young officers to overthrow him
when he attempted to manipulate election laws and force the
legislature to extend his term another five years (Schmidt,
p.42) .
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CHAPTER 3
INSTITUTIONAL RULE
(1944-1979)
On April 2, 1944, when Martinez was out of the country,
a coup was carried out. Initially repressed by the dictator' 1
troops, the coup led to a general strike by government, bank,
and commercial employees, as well as students and
professionals. On April 8 Martinez was forced to resign. He
appointed one of his generals, Andres Menendez, to act as
interim president. Somewhat unexpectedly, Menendez appointed
a balanced cabinet and called for prompt elections. A number
of candidates clamored for the upcoming election. Had the
election be held as planned, the popular civilian Arturo
Romero probally would have won. Members of the military high
command, however, were not willing to accept the inauguration
of a civilian regime. Increasing violence and divisions
within the military forced the interim president out of
office. The military postponed the elections, and placed
Colonel Osmin Aguirre, director of the national police and
architect of La Matanza, in power (Webre, 1979)
Aguirre cracked down on members of the opposition, yet
went through with the postponed elections. The army's
candidate, General Salvador Castenada Castro, was assured
victory and on March 5, 1945, Castenada was inaugurated. The
primary difficulty of his presidency was maintaining peace
within an increasingly divided military.
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Revolution of 194 a
In the 1940s, at least three factions were visible with
the armed forces. One group consisted of senior officers
associated with the Martinez regime, such as Aguirre and
Castenda. The second faction, who had been involved in the
coup of 1944, were made up of younger, more progressive-minded
officers whose prominence was to increase during the late
1940s. A third group was made up of a fading minority of
patrician liberals who opposed military rule, often from exile
(Baloyra, 1982; Webre, 1979). Factionalism was a recurring
phenomena in the Salvadoran miliary.
Castenada was distrustful of the faction of young
officers and made policies that limited the possibility of
their promotion. On December 14, 1948, the morning the
president called for a constitutional amendment to extend his
term, the group of young officers, known as the Juventud
Militar
,
overthrew him. After the now commonplace internal
bickering and posturing, the newly dominant group produced a
leader: Major Oscar Osorio. Osorio, heading the newly founded
party of the "revolution of 1948"—Partido Revolucionario de
Unificacion Democratica (PRUD)
,
went on to win the elections
of 1950. Thus began an era of institutional military rule and
the end of personalistic dictatorship began by Martinez some
eighteen years before.
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The formation of the PRUD, later named the Partido de
Concilacion Nacional (PCN) f reveals a phenomena common to
Latin America's military-as-governments
. The PRUD established
the military as an elected and constitutional actor, but at
the same time an anti-democratic one. The military dominated
the political field while legitimating the ambitions of the
military through its reference to the Constitution which
spelled out its role the defender of "national interests."
The PRUD-PCN was simultaneously the state party and the
military under which arrangements were made between civilian
or military bureaucracy and the oligarchy. This "military
party" controlled political life, had majority in the Congress
and routinely had a colonel or general "elected" to the
presidency. (Rouquie, 1986; 1987).
After Osorio took power, an era of "reformism" began, led
by this new group of "progressive" officers, government
technocrats, and entrepreneurs who wanted to industrialize the
country (Arnson, 1982). The era of military reformism begun
in the 1950s can be traced back to the former regime. When
observing the military's response to opposition and social
unrest, the cycle of unrest, repression, reform, renewed
repression becomes apparent (Shulz and Graham, 1984) . Why
would the military, a group of supposedly rational
individuals, pursue a policy of meeting challenges to the
status quo with repression if such measures inevitably led to
more unrest? Montgomery offers a commonly accepted view of
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the military's role in the years after La Matanza. "a
constant in Salvadoran life was the use of repression to
maintain order when persuasion failed" (1982, p.56).
Ultimately, however, this cycle proved to be both costly and
counterproductive
.
Mason and Krane, in their work on the political economy
of state-sanctioned terror in El Salvador, explain that when
the regime is faced with an expansion in the opposition's base
of support it has two broad strategies to choose from in its
effort to meet challenges to its authority: it can either
increase its reliance on repression or attempt to accommodate
popular demands through reform. The military in El Salvador
is trained in coercion and repression, but as the events after
1932 have shown such, the numbers of the opposition as well
have put a strain on the state and necessitated that the
military balance repression with limited reform as well.
Mason and Krane state:
As raw trainees and para-military deathsquads are
unleashed in the countryside, their blunt, arbitrary
applications of force will exacerbate the process by
which the otherwise uninvolved turn toward the
insurgents for security from state-sanctioned
terror.
. . .eventually, the regime's financial
resources will be strained by the cost of constantly
expanding its coercive machinery (1989, p.185).
This seemingly self-defeating behavior requires a more
careful examination of the forces that are brought to bear on
the military and the political calculus it employs. These
issues will be taken up in the following chapter. The era of
institutional military rule and reformism, I argue, is best
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seen as a continuation of the time-tested policies of the
past. The difference is the military placed more emphasis on
reform than repression and attempted to achieve a state of
hegemony. I believe probing the nature of this balance of
repression and reform is a key issue in understanding the
military
.
The "revolution of 1948" is effectively described by the
Gramscian terms passive revolution and organic crisis. A
passive revolution is derived from the notion that society has
to change if is to preserve its most fundamental structures.
In essence
,
a passive revolution is a preemptive response from
above to the disorganized but potentially revolutionary
demands of the dominated classes. it is the restoration of
ruling class power in rearranged and redeployed political
forms. "it is," Fatton explains, "a revolution without a
revolution" (1986, p.732). The passive revolution is brought
on by a profound disruption or threat to the power of the
ruling class. This is described by Gramsci as an organic
crisis
.
According to Gramsci, at certain moments in history
society confronts a crisis which engulfs the totality of its
structure. Authority is delegitimized
,
old values
disintegrate, the economy is paralyzed, the ruling classes are
sustained almost exclusively by force, the dominated classes
no longer put up with their subaltern status, and the state
cannot guarantee its preservation (Hoare and Smith, 1971)
.
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The coup of 1948 and other "reformist" ones that
followed it, I argue, are well described as a passive
revolution. Similarly, the rising militancy of the popular
sectors, economic malaise, and other threats to the status quo
presented the military with a situation like that of Gramsci's
organic crisis. These concepts lead to a recognition of the
miliary as a skillful political actor rather than a crude
instrument of force. Despite internal divisions and
authoritarian policies, the Salvadoran military has shown
through its history an exceptional amount of statecraft as
demonstrated by it ability to respond to internal crises and
external pressures.
Institutional Military Rule
Beginning with the regime of Osorio and ending with the
electoral fraud of 1972, the military was engaged in the
routine of reform when possible and repression when necessary.
Shulz describes politics in El Salvador as a "homeostatic
system" in which efforts at reform were limited by repression
whenever it threatened to challenge the status quo (1984,
p.196) . It must be said, however, that some attempts were
made by the state to alleviate some of the country's problems.
Increased industrialization and agricultural diversification
brought on a period of rising prosperity. While
revolutionaries were still attacked by the military, moderates
were coopted into the system, unions were allowed to organize,
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The military'
and opposition groups given more freedom,
party, Partido Revolutionario de Unificacion
s
Democratica
,
created a social security system, sponsored the development of
housing, and provided agrarian credit to a limited number of
campesinos. Although relatively few in number, some of the
governments policies led to a rise in the living standards of
the country's poor. Of course, deep problems like agrarian
reform were never addressed and the power of the military and
economic elite was never put in jeopardy. The PRUD, and later
the PCN
,
existed a means for holding on to the military's
power. They were not ideological parties, but created for the
sole purpose of maintaining a facade of legitimacy (Christian,
1986)
.
During this period of institutional rule the miliary
academy, the Esquela Militar
,
came to a play a large role in
fostering the military's identity and reinforcing internal
control. Young cadets who made it through tough entrance
requirements could expect years of free education and living
expenses, and a respectable life-long career afterwards.
While they could never become members of the landed class, a
Salvadoran officer could aspire to a position in the
government or even president (Doyle and Duklis, 1990)
.
Each graduating class of officers, or tanda
,
generally
moves up the ranks together regardless of ability. Members of
each tanda develop deep bonds of loyalty to each other and
help shield fellow members from prosecution and punishment.
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Loyalty to one's tanda often takes priority over one's loyalty
to the military institution itself (Walter and Williams,
1993). Tandas act to thwart the creation of a more
professional military and reinforce the fact that not only do
the armed forces not blindly serve the needs of the elite, but
they often act against the military institution itself. The
obligation to protect fellow Esquela colleagues often
supersedes the officer's obligation to the armed forces or the
country. 7
During institutional military rule, politics in El
Salvador followed a course that became routinized.
Incremental change was made when convenient to the military
and elite. Governments changed hands by either fixed
elections or juventud militar-led coups. Unrest from an ever-
growing underclass increased, but with noticeably more
vehemence
.
The Cuban Revolution and the subsequent Alliance for
Progress introduced the military to the techniques of
counterinsurgency as a new means of combatting the enemy
within. Although El Salvador had no guerrilla movements at
This point is made clear in the Jesuit murders in 1989.
Members of La Tandona, the "big class" of 1966, shielded thoseinvolved in the crime from prosecutors. Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa,
a retired officer and member of ARENA said candidly: "We are
finally seeing the consequences of tendencies we have seen within
the institution for several years ... tandas protect each other,
that is the problem. The sin is that this large tanda has
overprotected itself and is bringing down the entire institution,"
see D. Farah, "Ties of Loyalty Help Salvadoran Military sidestep
Full Purge", Washington Post. January 12, 1993.
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was seen as
the time, the presence of us military advisers
preventative medicine. The Alliance for Progress and US
military advisers had a lasting effect on the country and the
military
.
The Alliance for Progress put modernization theory into
practice. The program consisted of two main elements:
military and economic aid. By providing El Salvador's
military with training in counterinsurgency and civic action,
the United States hoped to create a professional institution
capable of defeating Cuban-type revolutionaries and winning
the support of the masses. Through economic aid and
investment, the Alliance for Progress sought to foster the
growth and modernization of democratic ideals (Phillip, 1985)
.
During the height of the program in 1962-1965, El
Salvador got more funds than any other Central American
republic. The United States strongly influenced the growth of
such infrastructures as transportation, oil refining, and
electricity. The CIA called El Salvador "one of the
hemisphere's most stable, progressive republics" (LeFeber,
1984) . By the middle 1960s, the growth in food processing,
textiles, chemical production, and many other industries
placed El Salvador ahead of all other Central American
countries in economic output (Dunkerly, 1982). The Alliance
for Progress was intended to reform some of the inequities in
Salvadoran society and thus undermine the conditions that
might make the country susceptible to revolutionary
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machinations. Rather than alleviate social and economic
problems, however, the Alliance for Progress intensified them.
The oligarchy was traditionally leery of foreign
investment, but became increasingly supportive of the
favorable terms presented in the Alliance for Progress.
Between 1961 and 1975, 80-90 percent of agricultural credit
was channeled to export enterprise (Dunkerly, 1982).
Washington's policies helped to increase the wealth and power
of many sectors of the agricultural elite. Another enduring
effect of the Alliance for Progress was its impact on the
Salvadoran military.
The CIA, the Green Berets and the US State department all
played a role in the development of sophisticated security
forces trained in counterinsurgency. Many Salvadoran soldiers
were brought to the US-run School for the Americas in the
Canal Zone where they were schooled in unconventional warfare.
One of the most notorious groups created by the US was the
Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN)
. ORDEN sought
to undermine the support of El Salvador's growing
revolutionary movements by engaging the campesinos in various
civic-action projects and defense organizations. Peasants who
joined ORDEN were often provided favorable credit terms,
health care, and employment. For many of El Salvador's rural
poor, ORDEN was a means out of poverty (Jung, 1986). In
return, campesinos were required to participate in defense
patrols and report subversive activities to the miliary and
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National Guard. As it developed, the organization became a
powerful means of repression in the countryside.
ORDEN occupied an ambiguous state role. Technically
controlled by the president, daily control rested with the
Ministry of Defense. ORDEN had no formal budget, no published
statues and no public accountability. Dunkerly describes the
organization as a kind of fascist political party that sought
to incorporate a mass movement of peasants pledged to the
destruction of unions and revolutionary groups ( 1982
,
p.76).
Whether ORDEN was ever envisioned as a mass party in the
countryside is debatable, but it is clear that the
organization was a source of violence and terror in the
countryside. Patrullas Cantonales
,
a part-time police force
organized by ORDEN, were responsible for widespread abuses and
outright murder (LeFeber, 1984).
The military's involvement in ORDEN epitomizes its two-
pronged strategy: tepid attempts at reform and legitimation
backed by coercion and repression. This behavior can be
described by inverting Gramsci ' s formula of "hegemony armored
by coercion." We can speak of the military as a coercive
institution wrapped in hegemony: when the protective cover of
ideology and legitimation is stripped away, its coercive core
is revealed (Hoare and Smith, 1971; Lowy and Sader, 1985).
Military presidents continued to experiment with small
amounts of political and social reform. President Adalberto
Rivera, who had come to power through yet another coup in
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1961, sought to alleviate growing internal pressure, as well
as pressure from the US, by opening the electoral process to
opposition parties (Montgomery, 1982). The most significant
party to emerge from this newly created political space was
the Christian Democrat party (PDC)
. The support this new
party was able to generate ultimately led to an end to the
military's experiment with limited reform and liberalization.
A new president. General Sanchez Hernandez, came to power
in a typically fraudulent election in 1967. Hernandez was the
army's candidate and head of the Partido Reconciliation
Nacional (PCN)
,
the revamped form of prud. Hernandez
inherited a country that was showing increasingly large
fissures. Support for opposition parties and criticism of the
regime put heavy pressure on the government. Labor protests
and student-led strikes became more frequent. The new
president railed against communist subversion and received
larger amounts of counterinsurgency training from the US
(Webre, 1979) . Internal pressures were alleviated, albeit
temporarily, by the "Soccer War" with Honduras in 1969.
Long existing border disputes, as well as El Salvador's
exploding population are cited as the principal causes of the
hundred-day war (Browning, 1971; Anderson, 1971). The
Salvadoran military won the war with Honduras and also seems
to have bought itself a quick dose of legitimacy at home. The
Christian Democrats went from winning 78 municipalities in
1967 to a mere eight in 1970. The PCN, capitalizing on an
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upsurge of nationalist sentiment, won 60 percent of the vote
in the 1970 elections (Shulz and Graham, 1984). The
military's new-found legitimacy, however, was short-lived.
The cycle that had existed for some forty years broke down
with the events surrounding the elections of 1972 and 1977
.
The euphoria surrounding El Salvador's military victory
soon faded. Demographic pressures, once alleviated by a
tradition of migration to Honduras, increased as El Salvador
was forced to absorb 130,000 Salvadoran refugees that had fled
from Honduras. El Salvador had enjoyed a lucrative market
with its neighbor, but the war brought it to a halt and
further strained the government. What President Johnson had
once called, "a model for the other Alliance countries,'' was
rapidly deteriorating. In 1971, ten years after the Alliance
for Progress began, the number of landless families had
tripled (LeFeber, 1984) . Clearly, to avert further crises,
some kind of agrarian reform would have to be initiated. The
implementation of such policy, however, was intolerable to the
country's elite.
President Hernandez, perhaps realizing the powder-keg he
was sitting on, sought to address the issue of land reform.
A National Agrarian Reform Congress was held in 1970. In
elections for March of that year, Hernandez made known his
plans to enact reforms in agriculture, education, and
government administration. Predictably, the oligarchy reacted
with alarm. Under heavy pressure and for the sake of self-
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survival, Hernandez was forced to moderate his policies (Shulz
and Graham, 1984)
.
Meanwhile, the military found itself increasingly
isolated. The popularity of the PDC grew as the party joined
forces with other opposition forces and formed the National
Opposition Union (UNO) behind the leadership of Jose Napoleon
Duarte in a bid for the 1972 elections. The PCN, under
sustained attack from the oligarchy and other members of the
far-right, faced mass desertions from the party. while
Hernandez recognized the need for moderate reform, he was not
about to allow the PCN to be defeated in the upcoming
elections of 1972. The candidate chosen to run against UNO
was Colonel Arturo Armando Molina, Hernandez' personal
secretary.
When election day came on February 20, the government's
fears were confirmed. At first Molina was ahead, but as vote
tallies began to come from the more populated areas, UNO's
victory seemed clear. Molina suffered his most severe loss in
San Salvador, home of 30 percent of the country's registered
voters, where Duarte beat him by a margin of two to one
(Webre, 1979) . When it became clear that the PCN was going to
lose, the government banned the broadcasting of election
returns and later announced that its candidate—Molina—had
won by a slim margin. Duarte was arrested, tortured, and
driven into exile. A small group of junior officers launched
an ill-fated coup. Although they were not associated with
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UNO, they supported the coalition in denouncing the miiitary's
fraudulent behavior. The revolt was quickly put down when it
became clear the officers would generate no national support.
On February 25, the National Assembly convened and elected
Molina president, who had only obtained a plurality of the
vote
.
In one sense, the election of 1972 was typical of
Salvadoran politics. Faced with an unfavorable electoral
outcome, the military committed blatant fraud to assure it
won. What was different about this election, was that it
produced a radicalization in the opposition and terminated any
pretense of moderation or reform.
Deterioration of the Regime
The "homeostatic system" of institutional military rule
had been forever disrupted. The system intended to maintain
the domination of the armed forces in an alliance with the
more significant economic groups in the country. But, as
Baloyra explains, "the elections of 1972 and the military
revolt represent a drastic discontinuity in the operation of
the Salvadoran model of one-party domination" (1982, p.48).
Where before the system had been characterized by the
alternate uses of repression and reform, the military came to
rely almost exclusively on repression.
Baloyra explains that regime deterioration is brought on
by two main factors: the government is unable to either
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maintain order or control the growing animosity between itself
and society, and the emergence of a well-organized opposition
confronts the regime, mobilizing the population and becoming
a viable alternative (Baloyra, 1985). After the electoral
fraud of 1972, the Salvadoran government found itself in such
a crisis. Increased reliance on repression, economic
malaise, and the rise of guerrilla groups such as the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Farabundo Marti Popular
Liberation Forces (FPL)
,
hastened the deterioration of the
military regime. While social and political problems in El
Salvador have deep roots, the events of 1972 and there after
marked the beginning of the country's descent into internecine
conflict, and ultimately, civil war.
Traditionally, when faced with a crisis the military
responded with a combination of carrots and sticks in an
effort to regain its balance and legitimacy. The government
of Colonel Molina was no exception. Under the banners of "law
and order" and "anticommunism" Molina's first act was to close
the National University which was seen as a communist
stronghold (Webre, 1979). During Molina's presidency, the
military opened fire on a group of students protesting the
government's expenditure of $30 million on the 1975 Miss
Universe pageant. At least 37 were killed and many were
disappeared (Montgomery, 1982)
.
Violence in El Salvador seemed to exist on a quid-pro-quo
basis. As one group committed an act of violence, retribution
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spectrum was sure to
from the other end of the political
follow. Members of the ERP and FPL specialized in
bankrobbing, kidnapping of prominent Salvadorans, and
assassination. An increasingly radicalized right-wing, backed
wealthy landowners and reactionary members of the military,
formed para-military and deathsquads to combat what they saw
as the rising communist threat. Patterned after ORDEN, groups
such as Anti-Communist Wars of Liberation Armed Forces
(FALANGE) and the White Warrior's Union (UGB) terrorized
peasant groups in the countryside, members of the clergy, and
all other "subversives" (Pyes, 1986)
.
While the repression undertaken by Molina was not unique,
the efforts he made to appease rising social unrest were.
Most of his reforms were modest, such as raising the minimum
wage for agricultural workers and nationalizing the
International Railroad of Central America. Molina's efforts
at agrarian reform were more ambitious. In an attempt to
regain hegemony, Molina attempted to address the most
explosive issue in El Salvador: agrarian reform. Agrarian
reform had been effectively off limits as subject of debate
since La Ma.tan.za and thus the president's efforts were highly
controversial
.
Molina initiated a program of "agrarian transformation"--
the term agrarian reform was seen as too provocative—that
sought to pacify the swelling number of landless and
campesinos. Rural unemployment reached 57 percent in 1973 and
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Molina feared more trouble in the countryside if he did not do
something (Arnson, 1982).
Molina began by decreeing the nationalization of 61,000
hectares of cattle and cotton land which was to be divided
among 12,000 campesino families (Montgomery, 1982: 90). Next
Molina sponsored a law in 1974 that provided for the forced
rental of unexploited and underexploited lands. Another law
passed in 1975 created the Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian
Transformation (ISTA) which would facilitate the transfer of
land. The creation of ISTA, rather than quell a highly
volatile situation, seemed only to add fuel to the fire.
Conservative members of the oligarchy reacted with new
ferocity in opposition to ISTA. The agrarian program produced
an intense confrontation between Molina and his group of
reform-minded officers and the traditional oligarchy. Not
only was this a conflict between civilians and the military,
Baloyra explains, but a fight between two members of the upper
class as well.
Members of the industrial bourgeoisie, considerably more
moderate than large landowners, saw some kind of land reform
as a necessity. The traditional oligarchy, on the other hand,
regarded any kind of enfranchisement or appeasement of the
rural population as unacceptable. Two organizations, the
Asociation Nacional de la Empresa Nacional (ANEP) and the
militant Frente Agrario de la Region Oriental (FARO) launched
a political and media blitz to defeat the program.
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Ultimately, the oligarchy got what it wanted (Baloyra, 1982).
Molina agreed to a "compromise" that effectively defanged
ISTA.
The crisis brought on by ISTA is instructive in many
ways. The event provides an example of the military's
tenacious belief in the utility of reform and repression.
President Molina inherited a grave situation that got worse.
The first part of his presidency was marked by an effort to
regain "order" and silence the opposition. Then, after
asserting his authority, Molina thought he could follow up
with a number of reforms and preempt an impending crisis in
the countryside, as had been done in the past. Events in El
Salvador had deteriorated to such a degree, however, that
piecemeal efforts could no longer work. The population was
well over three million in the 1970s, leftist groups had taken
up arms against the government, previously inert campesinos
were increasingly organized, and the country's economy
continued to worsen. And in the middle of this, the
agricultural elite was determined to hold its privileges,
whatever the cost. Molina's presidency and the ISTA crisis
also demonstrate the resurgent factionalism within the armed
forces. One of the most enduring features of Salvadoran
politics has been the number of coups, counter-coups, and
reforms initiated by the reformist wing of the military or
juventud militar. The events of the 1970s placed a wider gulf
between sectors of the military and the oligarchy. During the
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Molina administration, the military had exceeded its assigned
role as manager of the regime and had to be put in its place
by the oligarchy.
The fraud perpetrated in the presidential elections of
1977 came as a surprise to no one. The new president, General
Carlos Humberto Romero, was a counterinsurgency expert who was
reported to have threatened Molina with a coup if he went
forward with his land reforms (Montgomery, 1982). Romero
assumed office without any pretense of reform.
During Romero's tenure violence continued unabated and
both the far right and left became more militant. Romero,
convinced that reform would not work, relied on repression.
Romero was influenced by ANEP and FARO to deal more harshly
with the opposition (Guidos Vejar, 1980). In 1977, he passed
the Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order which
was, in essence, a declaration of martial law. The law did
little to stop mass rallies and labor strikes, but was
responsible for an escalation state-sponsored violence. Under
Romero, political assassinations increased tenfold,
prosecutions of "subversives" increased threefold and the
number of disappearances doubled (Baloyra, 1982). These
numbers do not include guerrilla violence, which increased as
well. El Salvador soon gained the epithet of one of the worst
violators of human rights.
The military and the oligarchy traditionally maintained
a defensive alliance to maintain order, control the economy,
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and stave off rising unrest and popular mobilization. The
1970s, however, represent the growth of conflict within the
ever-tenuous military-oligarchic relationship.
As discussed above, the moves made by Molina and the
progressive wing of the military in agrarian reform enraged
the members of the traditional oligarchy. Romero's presidency
was first seen as a return to power by the reactionary wing of
the armed forces. Romero's heavy-handed measures and
rejection of his predecessor's reforms were received favorably
by the economic elite. In spite of what seemed like a return
to a symbiotic relationship between the military and elite,
however, antipathy for Romero grew not only among the popular
sector, but within the oligarchy as well. The differences
occurred on ideological lines.
The military's overriding commitment was to the defense
of the state and maintenance of institutional interests and
the pursuit of these goals often eclipsed oligarchic interests
(Walter and Williams, 1993) . For example, the Asociacion
Salvadorena de Benef iciadores y Exportadores de Cafe
(ABECAFE)
,
an oligarchic stronghold, ran into conflict with
the Compania Salvadorena de Cafe (COSCAFE)
,
a state-run
enterprise. In 1978, COSCAFE found it necessary to restrict
exports in an effort to combat the fall of coffee prices. The
ABECAFE, composed of powerful export families, vigorously
opposed the government's actions (Baloyra, 1982). Despite
their opposition to the government, COSCAFE won out. This
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incident demonstrates a breech of the military's traditional
role. No longer were economic matters dictated solely by
oligarchic interests. The armed forces began to assert
autonomy in economic affairs.
As guerrilla armies and popular organizations continued
to organize and grow, the military's ideology and behavior
centered on anticommunism, while the oligarchy's primary
interests lay in maintaining a favorable trade climate and
economic autonomy. In spite of the military's crackdown on
the opposition, long-existing fissures between the military
and oligarchy grew wider and the system became dangerously
unstable. Tensions increased as a result of the military's
need to increase the repression of the well-organized
opposition. Romero's status as an international pariah and
his inability to maintain order at home led to the rupture of
the military-oligarchic coalition and, ultimately, his
overthrow.
On October 12, 1979 a coup was undertaken. When it
became clear that all units of the armed forces had withdrawn
their support for Romero, he fled the country. On the 15th,
the military explained its actions in the "Proclamation of the
Armed Forces of El Salvador." The document condemned the
Romero administration's for violating human rights,
corruption, ruining the economy, and sullying the name of the
armed forces and El Salvador (Loveman and Davies, 1989). It
identified the source of the country's problems in the
80
"inadequate economic, social, and political structures which
have traditionally prevailed in the country." Electoral
fraud and underdevelopment had resulted from the "ancestral
privilege of the dominant class" (Loveman and Davies, 1989).
To remedy these problems, the military proposed a wide-ranging
program that included a full amnesty, an end to human rights
abuses, and agrarian reform. The military also pledged to
provide food, housing, and health care to all citizens and
promised free and open elections (Dunkerly, 1982). As events
unfolded, however, it became clear that the military's efforts
were too late to prevent a social and political explosion long
in the making.
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CHAPTER 4
FROM CIVIL WAR TO UNCERTAIN PEACE
(1979-1992)
The October coup, like those of 1944, 1948, and 1960,
sought to bring forth a new generation of military officers
claiming to represent a clean break with the past. The
success of the Nicaraguan revolution some four months earlier
sent a powerful message to the military in El Salvador that
caused many officers to wonder if they too could fall to the
guerrillas. in many ways, then, the October coup was a
preemptive act designed to counter a similar explosion in El
Salvador, another example of Gramsci's passive revolution. In
this respect the coup was similar to previous ones that sought
to rebalance the system of reform and repression. As events
progressed however, the October coup ushered a new, and more
violent, era.
While it is true that members of the juventud militar
genuinely believed in the need for some reform, the military's
highly charged rhetoric must be heard with a critical ear.
The coup—maker ' s desire to distance themselves from the
"ancestral privilege" of the oligarchy was not born out of any
heart-felt democratic ideals, but out of institutional
interest. The military sought to increase its power, not
lessen it.
Many things stayed the same. While the military's
proclamation pledged to abolish ORDEN, the patrullas
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cantonales would remain intact. Further, obligatory military
service and civic action projects were to be maintained. The
proclamation made no mention of democratizing civil-military
relations nor reducing the military's well-entrenched role in
the state (Walter and Williams, 1993). Because the
military's efforts amounted to too little too late, it becomes
clear in retrospect why the country rapidly descended into a
long and bloody civil-war. Furthermore, as Walter and
Williams explain, the paradox of events following the coup was
that
:
at the very time that a military-dominated junta wasransferr ing power to a civilian president, the militarywas successfully consolidating its presence in the
state, expanding its network of control in the
countryside, and maintaining its institutional
autonomy (1993, p.55).
I will show that although power was handed over to
c ^v ^^-*-ans
'
the military actually embedded itself deeper in
political affairs and thus stood in the way of meaningful
democratic gains.
The October coup, the civil war, and the peace accords of
1992 are adequately discussed in a large number of works
(Gettleman, et al, 1986; Klare and Kornbluh, 1988; Lefeber,
1983; Karl, 1992). It is not my intention to narrate that
which is already well known. This chapter, therefore, will
attempt to synthesize some of the main events and developments
of this period as they relate to the military. In particular,
I will examine the development of civil-military relations,
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the role of the United States, changes in military ideology,
and the armed forces' part in ending the war
The Civil-Mi litarv Juntas
The coup was undertaken by at least three factions within
the military. The first group was made up of reactionary
elements of the armed forces who appear to have played a small
role in formulating the subsequent proclamation. The second
group was headed by Colonel Adolfo Majano and a number of
young, reform-minded officers. This group had links with the
ill-fated coup of 1972. Majano believed in the need for basic
reforms, but also advocated direct military confrontation with
the guerrillas. The third group involved in the coup had
close ties with the US. This faction was headed by Colonel
Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, commander of the military academy, and
Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia, president of the state
telecommunications agency ANTEL.
The months that followed the coup were marked by an
intense period of political maneuvering among the military,
various political parties, and increasingly, the US
government. Out of the rather chaotic events of the coup
emerged the first of four civilian-military juntas. The junta
was led by Colonel Majano, Colonel Gutierrez and three
civilians. The civilian members were Raymond Mayorga, former
president of the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) ; Guillermo
Ungo, general secretary of the socially democratic National
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Revolutionary Movement (MNR) ; and Mario Andino, a moderately
conservative businessman (Montgomery, 1982). The members of
the junta sought to implement the goals outlined in the
military proclamation, but it rapidly became apparent that
the military members of the coup did little to follow through
with their promised reforms and drifted sharply to the right.
Colonel Gutierrez appointed his former boss at ANTEL,
Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia, to the post of defense
minister. Garcia had earned a reputation for his harsh
treatment of peasant groups when he served as a commander in
the San Vincente region. Next, Garcia and Gutierrez appointed
Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova as director of the National
Guard and Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila as head of the National
Police. Both appointees belonged to a hard-line faction of
the military (Arnson, 1982) . The new military high command
resembled the conservative military of old rather than a
reformist one.
The civilian participants in the junta agreed to take
part in it because they believed the juventud militar could
keep the other factions in check and because they thought this
faction of the military was committed to significant reform.
Neither belief proved true.
It became clear that the reformist members of the
military and their civilian allies in the junta had no control
over the military and security forces. In the first week of
the junta, 160 people were killed in clashes with the police
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(LeFeber, 1986). On December 27, 1979 a arcmn' g oup of civilian
government ministers, justices of the Supreme Court, and
directors of state enterprises demanded that Consejo
Permanente de la Fuerza Armada (COPEFA) assert its authority
over the reactionary elements of the armed forces and
reconfirm its commitment to the reforms spelled out in the
early days of the October coup. COPEFA was created by the
junior officers involved in the coup to represent the views of
the reformsit wing of the military and make sure the
principles of the junta were carried out.
COPEFA responded that it, "was not a political
organization [and] could not be diverted from its
institutional mission by extremist attempts" (Baloyra, 1982)
.
In essence, the group claimed it wouldn't give the civilians
what they wanted. Ungo and Mayorga charged that, "the false
notion of the neutrality of the military as an
institution.
. . .has generated a rightward turn in the process
of democratization and social change" (Arnson, 1982) . On
January 3, 1980, two civilian members of the junta, Ungo and
Mayorga, and all but one of the cabinet ministers resigned.
The departure of the civilians left the military with few
allies. In the face of rising international pressure,
especially from the US, the military needed to maintain a
semblance of reform. In 1977, President Carter cut military
aid from the Molina administration for human rights abuses and
despite the more conservative views of the Reagan
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administration, the military knew it had to moderate itself in
the eyes of the US. The Reagan administration was determined
to prevent
-another Nicaragua- and was prepared to train and
fund the Salvadoran military provided they could be portrayed
as
-reformed- to the US Congress and public. This proved
difficult.
On January 9, 1980, a second junta was formed with two
members of the Christian Democrats, Jose Antonio Morales
Ehrlich and Hector Dada. The new junta, decidedly more
conservative than the former, immediately came under attack
from the guerrillas, the Catholic church, and center-left
politicians. The US, however, found the new coalition more
than acceptable and promised thirty-six military advisers so
the military could wage a "clean counter-insurgency war." 8
Dada, who soon became disillusioned with the pace of reforms,
resigned from the junta. He was replaced by Jose Napolean
Duarte, the popular Christian Democrat who had been in exile
since the military denied him the presidency in 1972. To add
a veneer of badly needed legitimacy, the junta named Duarte
president. This unlikely alliance announced a land reform
program and a return to civilian rule under the terms of a new
constitution to be written by a Constituent Assembly to be
g A "clean counterinsurgency" were the words used by acting
Salvadoran charge d'affaires James Cheek to describe the effects of
US military aid.
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elected in 1982
. The pnr-mi -.ni-n fdc ilitary alliance would last through
two more juntas.
Although it had dubious intentions, the naming of a
civilian to the presidency marked a fundamental change in the
military's behavior. For fifty years the military had
controlled the office of the presidency. Suddenly, the second
junta named the very man driven out of the country when he
contested military rule in 1972. This is an exceedingly
important event that is inadequately addressed in the
literature on the Salvadoran military, it became clear in the
following years, however, that although the military ceded
titular control of the presidency to civilians, its gave up
little real power. In fact, freed from the burden of heading
the executive, the armed forces distanced themselves from
civil society and entrenched themselves deep into the state.
In a 1981 interview, Duarte remarked, "the army, as an
institution, is willing to accept political solutions, but the
others, the National Guard and the National Police, have been
trained for 50 years to do it the other way...." (Buckley,
1986) . The important point here is that the military did
accept a political solution, but not one that lessened their
power or necessarily brought the country any closer to
democracy. The armed forces had become shrewd players of the
political game.
The 1980 land reform was designed to proceed in three
phases. Phase I would convert estates larger than 500
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hectares into peasant cooperatives. Phase II would affect
farms between 100 and 500 hectares. Phase III would transfer
title of rented land to the current tenants, up to limit of
seven hectares per household. In each phase, former
landowners would be compensated in cash and bonds (Browning,
1983). Phase I was largely completed by the time of the 1982
elections, and phase Ill's implementation has already begun.
Phase II, on the other hand, would have encroached on most of
the coffee growing lands, and was postponed indefinitely,
attesting to the still-powerful coffee oligarchy (Mason and
Krane, 1989) . In the face of powerful guerrilla armies, the
land reform was designed as an effort to siphon away popular
support for the guerrillas.
In April 1980, after years of infighting, El Salvador's
revolutionary groups agreed to unite under the Revolutionary
Democratic Front (FDR) and the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front ( FMLN) (Le Feber, 1986) . The FDR brought
together sixteen different groups into one political
organization. The FMLN was comprised of five guerrilla
groups. Although the groups involved in the FMLN-FDR alliance
differed ideologically, they were united in their
determination to overthrow the government. With almost 10,000
troops, the FMLN was powerful enough in 1981 to launch a
"final offensive." Although the offensive did not accomplish
its desired results, it drew the new Reagan administration
deep into the conflict.
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At the other end of the political spectrum, the radical
right was busy waging its own kind of war. The disloyal
right9 regarded the land reform as treason and sought to
eliminate all subversive elements. During the reform's first
year, deathsquads and security forces assassinated over 500
peasant leaders, ISTA officials, Catholic and lay priests,
land reform workers, as well as hundred of members of peasant
unions and cooperatives (Mason and Krane, 1989). In 1981, the
year Phases I and III were being implemented 12,501 "extra-
judicial killings of civilians not engaged in armed combat"
occurred (Simon and Stephens, 1982). Once a hodge-podge of
both legal and illegal political groups, the disloyal right
soon formed a well-organized political party. Major Roberto
D'Aubuisson, a former intelligence chief with strong ties to
the Union Guerrera Blanca (UGB) paramilitary group, founded
the National Republican Alliance (ARENA) in September of 1981
and announced his plans to enter the 1982 elections.
1982 ELECTIONS
As promised, on March 28, 1982 elections were held.
Given the El Salvador's history of fraudulent elections,
Salvadorans did not greet the upcoming event with the same
enthusiasm as the Reagan administration did. The US placed
9 The term disloyal right as defined by Baloyra as groups or
individuals who engage in obstructionist tactics in order to
political the inauguration or consolidation of a democratic regime.
In the Salvadoran case, the term refers to those who have attempted
to thwart the goals of the October coup.
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its entire Salvadoran policy on the outcome of the elections.
The event was a classic example of a "demonstration election."
A demonstration election, as defined by Frank Brodhead and
Edward Herman, is an election in which the selection of
political leaders is secondary to a more important agenda.
The main purpose of the election is to convince the citizens
of the US that its client state (in this case El Salvador) is
"democratic" and "freely chosen" (Broadhead and Herman, 1982)
.
Only by demonstrating the democratic virtues of the Salvadoran
government could the Reagan administration legitimize to the
US Congress and public ever-growing amounts of military and
economic largesse.
By March 1982, some 30,000 Salvadorans had died at the
hands on security forces and deathsquads. Public opinion in
the US was decidedly against the support of such a regime. If
Duarte and the Christian Democrats won in a "free and fair
election"
,
the US could point to its support of a centrist
government and self-determination (Broadhead, 1986) . The
FMLN-FDR saw the political climate stacked strongly against
them and decided to boycott the elections. Thus, the two main
contenders were ARENA and the PDC. To Washington's chagrin,
D ' Aubbuison and ARENA won thirty-six of the sixty seats in the
constituent assembly. Duarte and the PDC, despite strong US
backing, only won twenty-four seats.
Before the election, the US state department had
denounced D'Aubbuisson as the leader of a "right-wing
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terrorist group" and claimed that only Duarte could restore
democracy to El Salvador. "After the election," LeFeber
explains, "the United States had to accept D'Aubbuisson as the
country's legislative leader—and elected by the process the
Reagan administration had devised" (1986, p. 288 ). Washington,
it seemed, only found elections useful when their candidate
won. After intense pressure and threatening to withhold
military aid, the US forced the Constituent Assembly to elect,
Alvaro Magana, a moderate businessman and member of the
centrist Accion Democratica (AD) instead of the unsavory
D'Aubbuisson.
CIVILIAN RULE AND CIVIL WAR
Magana tried to give his government a more moderate face
by appointing by civilians to important positions such as
Minister of the Interior and by replacing those military
°fficers serving as ambassadors. Magana's administration,
however, proved to be more of a "contraption" than a
government (Baloyra, 1982) . The government attempted to
balance the interests of the newly invigorated right, the
despondent PDC, and a factionalized military. In addition to
this, the Reagan administrations ' s need for the trappings of
a democratic government added strain to the government. As
Duarte remarked some years later, "Magana was viewed as a
friend by the military, politically neutral, acceptable to the
UN Embassy, a good compromise. The entire officer corps was
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consulted and approved" (Manwaring and Prisk, 1988)
. Juggling
these interests was no easy task.
The land reform agenda set out in 1980 was largely put on
hold. Only Phase I had been implemented and, of the land
affected by the program, 69 percent of it had been used for
cattle grazing and thus was not well-suited to crop
cultivation. Further, only 9 percent of coffee acreage was
subject to Phase I redistribution (Mason, 1986)
.
The provisional and unwieldy Magana administration was
followed by the election of Duarte in 1984 in another election
in which the US played a highly visible role. Duarte won by
a comfortable margin. Washington had finally gotten what it
wanted: a popularly elected, moderate president. Although the
conditions surrounding the election were suspect, the Reagan
administration was jubilant and was not concerned about such
details as obligatory voting, the limited number of voting
stations, retribution for not voting, and a generalized
climate of fear. With the party of their choice in power
(PDC)
,
US policy followed a pattern: vocal support for
"reform" and "democracy" while it showered the military with
unprecedented amounts of aid and training in low-intensity
warfare. Where once the Salvadoran military pointed to a
vague "communist threat" and sought to repress students,
unions, and priests, in 1980 the military had a full-fledged
war on its hands and seemingly unlimited amounts of North
American aid with which to fight it.
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In 1980
,
US military aid to the Salvadoran armed forces
amounted to six million dollars. This money was approved by
the Carter administration one week after the assassination of
Archbishop Romero, but was suspended after the military's
highly publicized role in the murder of four North American
churchwomen. In 1981, that figure jumped from $35.5 million
to $82 million in 1982 (LeFeber, 1984). By 1987, Washington
had provided more than $3.2 billion in economic and military
aid. This amounted to the equivalent $6,700 per Salvadoran
and more than six times the country's per capita income in
1987 (Siegel and Hackel, 1988). By the war's end in 1992, the
US had provided the military with more one billion dollars in
military aid.
With the huge infusion of aid, the size of the armed
forces grew rapidly. in 1981, when US military aid was just
beginning, the military and security forces numbered 12,000.
In 1984, that number had reached 42,000. Of course the number
of FMLN combatants increased as well, though the exact figures
were never known. In 1984, the guerrillas had about 10,000
troops, up from 2,500 in 1981. And in 1992, the armed forces
numbered 60,000—the largest military in Central America.
It is difficult to say exactly when El Salvador's civil
war began. Within the left, casualties inflicted by the
government had been accumulating for more than five decades.
For leftist groups and campesinos alike, everyday life was a
fight for survival. Guerrillas had been fighting against the
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government since the 1970s, but it is possibie to say it was
not until five of these groups united under the FMLN umbrella
that the war began in earnest. The FMLN ' s less than
successful "final offensive" in January 1981 seems to have
escalated the war for all involved: the FMLN, the Salvadoran
military, and the US (Dunkerly, 1982).
In partnership with its civilian allies, the FMLN
succeeding in establishing itself as "a representative
political force" in the eyes of France and Mexico, which
called for negotiations between the two sides in 1981. By
1983, according to most accounts, the guerrillas were actually
winning the war, while the Reagan administration and its
Salvadoran clients, pledged to "draw the line against
communism" in El Salvador, what ever the cost (Karl, 1992)
Increasingly, the interests of the Salvadoran armed forces
became indistinguishable from those of their North American
patrons
.
Magana's ascension to the presidency in 1982 coincided
with a rightward swing, a derechizacion
,
within the military.
Defense Minister Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia was ousted by
the more recalcitrant elements in the military. Garcia was
criticized for his willingness to do the United States'
bidding as demonstrated by his role in denying D'Aubuisson the
provisional presidency in 1982. After several months of
internal conflict, Garcia was forced to resign and was
replaced by the more ideologically rigid General Vides
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Casanova, the former of the National Guard. As the war
dragged on, the institutionalization of military abuses became
widespread. The Reagan administration attempted to portray
the right-wing violence in El Salvador as the work of
extremists not affiliated with the regime. This, however, was
not the case.
The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported
in 1985 that numerous Salvadoran military and security forces
as well as other official organizations were involved in
encouraging or conducting deathsquad activity or other violent
abuses, and the officers involved in these abuses appear to
have been part of a rightist terrorist underground (Diskin and
Sharpe, 1986) . Journalist Leonel Gomez states:
it is not an accident that people have been
systematically eliminated by uniformed soldiers orplainclothes policemen .... It is not surprising that not
a single massacre has been investigated and not a
single officer disciplined for carrying out that policy.
The Security council must cover its own complicity in
these crimes
.... (Diskin and Sharpe, 1986).
The civilian governments, beginning with Magana and
followed by Duarte in 1984 and Christiani in 1988, set in
motion a new type of regime. These regimes were characterized
by a civilian president with relatively little real power, an
entrenched and powerful military, and a dependence on US funds
and aid. This new arrangement lasted until the end of the war
in 1992. This situation represents more of a continuation of
the past than any move toward democracy. This point is made
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clear by an examination of what the military actually gave up
when presidential power was given to civilians.
Rather than decrease, the military's power has actually
increased with the ascendancy of civilians to the presidency.
It is possible to point to three factors or events that
contributed to the growth of the military's role in Salvadoran
society. These factors are the military's presence in various
state enterprises, the terms of the constitution of 1983, and
the US sponsored low-intensity warfare programs.
To begin, the juntas following the October coup kept many
important autonomous institutions in the hands of the
military. Among others, these included ANTEL (Administracion
Nacional de Telecomminicaciones)
,
CEPA ( Comision Ejecutiva
Portuario Autonoma)
,
ISSS (Instituto Salvadoreno del Seguro
Social) CEL (Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa)
Direccion General de Transporte Terreste, Direccion General de
Estadistica y Censos , the customs office and Civil
Aeronautics. The military also headed the Ministry of Public
Health and the Subsecretaries of the Interior and Agriculture
(Walter and Williams, 1993). The military's continued
presence in these agencies insured that the military's state-
role would be difficult to erode.
Both Magana and Duarte had some success in reducing the
influence of the military in government, but where unable to
root them out of several key positions. Throughout the 1980s
the military retained control of the security forces,
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intelligence agencies, and the military court system.
Further, the civilian executives exercised little influence
over the military budget, promotions, and training. Control
by the military effectively limits the ability of a civilian
government to advance interests contrary to those of the armed
forces (Pion-Berlin, 1992). The armed forces have shown
little regard for civilian politicians and their ability to
manage the government.
A second factor affecting the military's continued
presence in the state is the 1983 Constitution. The
Constitution afforded the military the primary responsibility
for guaranteeing compliance with the new Constitution and
other laws, ensuring the national defense and maintenance of
law and order, and defending the "democratic' system of
government (Walter and Williams, 1993). Though a civilian
occupied the presidency, the military was given the legal
ability to enforce its will with relatively little civilian
oversight. The military's claim to represent the constitution
and the welfare of the nation is a powerful weapon.
Rouquie explains, "those who hold military power know
that, whatever they say, there still exists above them a
superior legitimacy, the constitutional order" (1986, p.110).
These seems to be the case in El Salvador. Although much of
it may be simply rhetoric, the Salvadoran military does find
the need to at least maintain the appearance of constitutional
legitimacy. In El Salvador, the institutionalization of the
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military has involved
constitutional framework.
legalization within the
A third reason for the military's dominating presence is
the number of counterinsurgency programs that began in the
early 1980s. More than any other factor, this has contributed
to the military's omnipresence in El Salvador and the
militarization of Salvadoran society. As Michael Lowy and
Eder Sader explain, the militarization of society involves:
a form of state in which the military hierarchy (thehighest and intermediate levels of the officer corps)occupies the central position of the political realm-th
^
t
A?' Xt controls the essential government postsand the top offices within the state apparatus(ministries, directorships of large state enterprises,
and key administrative positions) (1985, p.8).
Lowy and Sader make an important clarification that is
particularly relevant to El Salvador. "it is important to
emphasize," they state, "that the militarization of the state
has not meant the exclusive use of coercion as a form of
domination" (1985, p.10). This point underlies a fact that is
often obscured in the all-too-common denunciations of the
Salvadoran military as a uniformly repressive institution. In
the 1980s, and throughout Salvadoran history, the military has
exercised a "hegemony armored by coercion." If we understand
hegemony as the totality of structures and institutions
capable of creating social consensus around a dominant group
or class (i.e. political parties, schools, the media, etc), we
can see that the Salvadoran military has not relied solely on
repression but a combination of both coercion and hegemony.
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As the war encompassed more of the country, the
military's presence increased as well. El Salvador in the
1980s was reminiscent of the political climate of the early
1960s. While the 1980s were more violent than the 1960s, many
similarities existed. The first substantial contingent of US
military advisers and aid came to El Salvador in the wake of
the Cuban revolution and Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. The
goal of these efforts was to undercut the support of would-be
insurgencies through a combination of military, social, and
economic programs. in the 1980s, the specter of communism
rose again and the US aimed to train and fund a military in El
Salvador capable of defeating the new menace. In both eras,
the United States perceived events in El Salvador in Cold War
terms and trained the military in counterinsurgency to combat
internal communist subversion.
"Counter-insurgency is the old name for low-intensity
conflict," according to Colonel John D. Waghelstein, former
head of the US military group (Milgroup) in El Salvador. What
was applied in Vietnam was updated for El Salvador. Pentagon
officials regard the type of conflict in El Salvador a
different kind of phenomena, necessitating a new kind of
response "The roots of insurgency are not military in origin,"
explained former Secretary of the Army John Marsh, "nor will
they be military in resolution" (Klare and Kornbluh, 1988)
.
According to the definition offered by the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, low-intensity warfare is a limited politico-military
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struggle to achieve a political, social, economic, and
psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges
from diplomatic, economic and psycho-social pressures through
terrorism and insurgency (Doyle and Duklis, 1990)
. Colonel
Wagelstein describes it more bluntly as a "total war at the
grass roots level" (Klare and Kornbluh, 1988)
.
In El Salvador, the official mission of the US was
threefold. First, to help the Salvadoran military defeat the
FMLN
,
the Salvadoran officers corp was to be persuaded to
subordinate to civilian authority. Second, the Armed Forces
needed to be taught a respect for human rights. And third,
the military needed to rationalize its internal methods of
organization and promotion (Bacevich, 1988) . However, as the
war wore on, it became clear that the US was concerned with
little more than the defeat and of the rebels and maintaining
the legitimacy of its intentions and the Salvadoran
government. As for the Salvadoran military, as long as it
promised to investigate abuses and professionalize itself, the
pipeline of aid would continue to flow.
In 1981, a Pentagon official said the Salvadoran army was
"not organized to fight a counterinsurgency war" and had "no
hope" in defeating the guerrillas with existing resources
(Siegel and Hackel, 1988). Although the military never
developed into the efficient fighting force envisioned by US
advisers, it did enjoy some success in fighting the
guerrillas. Where once it relied on large-scale troop
101
movements and the indiscriminate use of firepower, training in
low-intensity warfare produced a more sophisticated military.
In 1983, for example, the military undertook the National
Campaign Plan under US tutelage. The program was a rural
pacification program in three stages. Small, mobile cazador
units would seek out guerrillas with the help of the elite
rapid-reaction forces, such as the Atlacatl and Atonal
battalions. An Air Force equipped with Huey helicopters and
A-3 ? aircraft (both specially designed for guerrilla warfare)
would add additional support in the form of intensive bombing.
Then, after the region was secured, the army would set up
civil militias to provide local defense after the military had
left. Finally, US-funded development and reconstruction teams
would enter the area and attempt to address social and
economic programs (Doyle and Duklis, 1990). The success of
this program and others like it were mixed, but they did bring
about a change in the way the military fought the war and in
the way it regarded its place in society.
The military's traditional distrust of civilian
politicians was nurtured during the war. The officer's corp
continued to regard the armed forces as the only national
institution able to defend the state and establish public
order. The military was given wide latitude in the
implementation of social programs. Unidos para Reconstruir
was a civic-action program begun in 1986. Because it was
administered directly by the military and implemented in all
102
of the country's 14 departments, civilian leadership was
substantially overshadowed at both local and departmental
levels (Walter and Williams, 1993 )
Taken together, the continued presence of the armed
forces in important state agencies, the terms of the 1983
Constitution, and the US-sponsored low-intensity warfare
programs have heightened the military's role in El Salvador
since formal military rule came to an end in 1979. "Besides
helping to consolidate the military's position and confirm its
distrust of civilians," Walter and Williams explain, "the
civil war enabled the military to maintain its institutional
autonomy vis-a-vis the state and society.
... [in the 1980s] the
military became much less dependent upon the oligarchy and
much more autonomous as an institution with its own set of
interests" (1993, p.58). While this statement is revealing,
it tells only half of the story.
As the military became more autonomous and entrenched in
the state, it became ever-dependent on the US government for
weapons and training. The irony in this is important to
recognize if the military's institutional development is to be
better understood. The military was not free to do as it
pleased nor were its interests the sole source of its
behavior. US military aid was often conditioned on reforms
such as weeding out human rights abusers and allowing younger
officers to advance. While such demands were politically
expedient for both sides, it none the less demonstrates a
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significant constraint on the military and its institutional
development. Further, without US aid, it is quite possible
that the FMLN would have won the war (Diskin and Sharpe,
1986)
. The Salvadoran military was wholly dependent on
Washington's support. It could not have survived without it.
WAR'S END
The election of Alfredo Christiani to the presidency in
1988 did not bode well for ending the war. Christiani 's
party, ARENA, was founded by Roberto D'Aubuisson, the
embodiment of right-wing terror and intolerance. Although
ARENA moderated its platform after its defeat in the 1984
elections, few considered it a party of peace-makers. There
was speculation that right-wing violence might reach the
levels of the early eighties if ARENA launched an all-out war
on the opposition. Joaquin Villalobos, a commander of the
FMLN, wondered, "with the electoral triumph of ARENA, some
raise the phantom of repressive escalation and another
genocide. .. .We must ponder whether, under the current
correlation of forces, it is possible to carry out a new
genocide, close political space, and impose terror" (1989,
p . 2 1 ) .
Duarte had made several efforts at negotiations and
reaching a settlement with the guerrillas. For its part, the
FMLN had repeatedly tried to engage the military in peace
talks. Although some progress was made, the war was still
raging when Duarte left office. 10 In spite of the lack of
success in the past and the grim predictions surrounding the
Chnstiani government, the war was brought to a close 12 years
after it began and at a cost of 75,000 lives. No single event
was responsible for the negotiated settlement, but rather a
number of internal and external factors.
On the international front, the fall of communism and
ever-declining situation in Cuba forced the FMLN to reevaluate
its situation and take a more pragmatic approach. As early as
1987, rebel commander Villalobos recognized a "strategic
equilibrium" in the war. With no revolutionary triumph in
sight and popular opinion favoring peace, the FMLN pressed for
a negotiated solution and ultimately elections. "The FMLN
does not fear elections," Villalobos wrote. "Under fair
conditions the majority of Salvadorans would opt for
revolutionary change" (Villalobos, 1989a)
.
In the United States, the cold war policies of Ronald
Reagan were replaced by the constrained administration of
George Bush. Bush inherited a conflict in El Salvador more
than eight years old and seemed less-than-eager to continue
involvement in the area. Support of the military had turned
into a political liability for Bush. "The Bush
administration," explained Boston Globe correspondent Pamela
10 For a thorough discussion of the peace negotiations see
Terry Lynn Karl, "After La Palma: The Prospects for Democratization
in El Salvador," World Policy Journal (Spring) 1985, and Martin
Diskin and Kenneth Sharpe, "Facing Facts In EL Salvador," World
Policy Journal (Spring) 1984.
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Constable,
-which coincided with the collapse of Soviet
communism and the decline of Moscow's regional ally, Cuba,
adopted a more pragmatic attitude toward the conflicts in
Central America" (Constable, 1992). The US government had
simply grown tired of funding a war that seemed endless.
In El Salvador, a number of events precipitated the end
of the war. Shortly after Christiani took office, the FMLN
launched a powerful "final offensive" on November 11
,
1989.
The guerrillas, who nearly captured San Salvador, demonstrated
that they could match the strength of the Salvadoran armed
forces. in retaliation, the military murdered six jesuit
priests, along with their housekeeper and her daughter on the
campus of the Central American university. The murderers had
actually cut out the brains of the priests as if to
demonstrate that they had eliminated the intellectual base of
the FMLN. Rather than weaken the guerrillas, vociferous
international condemnation of the crime turned already
critical public opinion decidedly against the military and the
war. "More than anything else," Karl states, "[the] offensive
and the army's subsequent murder of the six Jesuit priests
drove home the point that a prolonged and inconclusive
struggle was less desirable than a political settlement (1992,
p . 151 ) . The Salvadorans had also grown weary of twelve years
of death and violence.
After months of UN sponsored peace talks, the war
officially ended on January 16, 1992. Karl wrote, "in what
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might be considered the hallmark of a successful negotiation,
both sides believe they have won" (1992, p.160). Clearly, the
FMLN has gotten much of what it wanted: a reduction in the
size of the military, the dissolution of the National Guard
and Treasury Police, the promise of prosecution of some of the
army's worst human rights abusers, and the government's pledge
to move forward with social and economic reforms. What's
more, the FMLN is able to enter the 1994 presidential
elections now that it is a legally recognized political party.
ARENA too seems to have emerged a winner. Not only can the
party point to its undeniably important role in the
negotiations, but it also presided over a decline in
inflation from 25 percent in the 1985-1988 period to 9.8
percent in 1991 and a growth rate of 3.5 percent (Envio,
1992) . ARENA can be expected to make a very strong showing in
the upcoming elections. Finally, the United States and United
Nations seem to have gained prestige for their role in
bringing one of the world's bloodiest civil wars to an end.
This leaves only one group to account for: the Salvadoran
military. What kind of political gains did it make? Does the
military, as Karl would have us believe, consider itself a
winner too?
Based on the terms of the peace accords, the military has
little cause to celebrate. If all the provisions of the
accords are carried out, the armed forces will be a smaller,
weaker, and more subservient version of its former self.
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Scores of soldiers are likely to punished for their role in a
host of human rights crimes. This leads to an important
question: Why did the military agree to a settlement so
stacked against them?
One answer might be that the military simply grew tired
of fighting. As Giuseppe Di Palma suggests that, "because
[war] weariness is not only temporary but also relative (one
is tired of an ineffective strategy and readier to renounce it
if a new one is made available), it seems to me that
introducing the lure of a viable political settlement at the
moment of weariness is possibly the best or even the only way
to interrupt the vicious cycle" (1986, p.41). The military's
response to the peace settlement and to its reconstitution has
been mixed.
Another possibility might be that the costs of the war
simply became too much. In a work on newly founded
democracies, Baloyra asks, why and in what circumstances do
the elites of an authoritarian regime decide to forego more
repression and opt for a change of regime? "One may
hypothesize," Baloyra says, "that because the repressive
capacity of a regime is not inexhaustible there will come a
point at which, given the sustained impact of deterioration
and the increasing costs of repression, a consensus for
extrication may emerge (Baloyra, 1987)
.
Of course, it is difficult to discern the level of
consensus in a relatively closed institution such as the
Salvadoran military. Baloyra offers a set of six determinants
which are likely to produce a decision by senior military
officials to disengage from the ways of the past:
1) military perception of the strength of the opposition*2) the choices available to the military; 3) the balance
the
we
ext:ni
ltary
rr
aperturistas and
* *? t Patterns of social cleavage; 5) thestantive programs of the opposition and 6) thepresence of actors traditionally antagonistic to themilitary (1987, p.40). n
In addition to these six determinants, I would add the
weighty force of world opinion. In the case of El Salvador,
an inquiry of the presence of these factors reveals a military
that was isolated and ultimately backed into a corner. Rather
than fight its way out, however, the military gave in.
At first the armed forces claimed victory and awaited the
reforms with stoicism. In a characteristic statement, former
Defense Minister Rene Emilio Ponce said, "we have successfully
completed the mission to defend the fatherland against
Communist aggression." Ponce stated that Salvadoran soldiers
"had never taken up arms for a more just cause," but added "we
are ready to assume the new mandate assigned to us"
(Christian, 1992) . After the findings of the UN Truth
Commission came out, Ponce's tone became far less
conciliatory.
Ponce declared that the findings of the report were
"unjust, illegal, unethical, prejudiced and insolent," and
went on say that "the armed forces. . .will use all necessary
legal resources as a legitimate right to self-defense against
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those who seek to destroy the military and the republic"
(Farah, 1993). The fact that Ponce himself was implicated in
the report may explain his vituperative tone. Perhaps even
more than this, however, Ponce's remarks may come from a fear
of the military's demise.
As should be clear from this chapter and the two
preceding it, above all else the military has acted to
preserve itself as an institution. How this is defined is of
course dependent upon which faction of the military is
referred to. But all groups, from the most rigid to the most
reformist, believe in the importance of their institution and
negotiating away much of its power is not compatible with the
military's history of fighting to maintain its institutional
integrity.
In the 1980s, the Salvadoran military came to see itself
as the only institution capable of enforcing political
tranquility. Regular infusions of US military equipment,
training and funding have served as constant reinforcements of
this belief, making violent repression the almost reflexive
response to mass political opposition (Mason and Krane, 1989)
.
The reasons surrounding the military's decision to support a
negotiated settlement seem directly related to El Salvador's
future. If the military's acceptance of the peace accords was
predicated on compulsion rather than a genuine commitment to
democratic ideals, then El Salvador's transition will prove to
be a difficult one indeed. Ruben Zamora, a candidate in
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1994 's presidential elections, summed up El Salvador's current
situation: »i think what is happening is that the armed
forces are faced with a historic dilemma, the same as the rest
country. The dilemma is whether we stay on the road toward
demilitarization or whether we stay a militarized society, and
that would lead back to war sooner or later" (Farah, 1993 ).
Ill
CHAPTER 5
EXPLAINING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SALVADORAN MILITARY
Each of the three theories presented in chapter one
offers some explanation of behavior of the Salvadoran
military, but based on the preceding historical sections I
believe a politically-based approach is the most effective.
At different times the Salvadoran military has displayed
reformist, institutionalized, and personalistic behavior. It
has attempted to improve the conditions of the rural poor, but
has also subjected them to some of the most sadistic abuse the
world has ever seen. The armed forces has pledged to uphold
the sanctity of the constitution and defend internal order,
and yet has overthrown the government in numerous coups
d'etat. This complex and often contradictory behavior points
to the need for a more diffuse approach that is not wedded to
any one set of criteria.
In light of the preceding three chapters, I will conclude
by attempting to answer the question I posed at the beginning
of this thesis: How is the behavior of the Salvadoran military
best explained? This is a fundamental question, but by no
means a simple one.
I will seek to answer this question by casting the
history of the institution against the three theories I
presented in chapter one. I will examine each theory as well
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as point out where the theories fall short, m so doing, I
hope to arrive at a better understanding of the Salvadoran
military. I will argue that each theory lends itself to an
understanding of the military, but a political approach is
most useful. I will conclude with a discussion of directions
for future research.
Dependency Theory
The central deficiency in dependency theory is that it
affords the military too little autonomy and places too much
emphasis on exogenous forces. At first glance, El Salvador
seems to fit neatly within the paradigm. Beginning in the
late nineteenth century, coffee exportation and the rise of
the rural oligarchy created a situation well described by
dependency theory. Once the military took control of the
state in 1931, however, its role changed. Dependency theory
cannot offer adequate explanation of the military after 1931.
El Salvador's underdevelopment, impoverished peasantry,
and authoritarian political systems stemmed in large part from
the country's reliance on the export of a single crop—coffee.
The great coffee-owning families of El Salvador amassed huge
fortunes while the majority of the rural-dwelling population
lived a semi-feudal life of poverty. The key to the
maintenance of this system was control of the countryside.
The state, run by and for the elite, created the military
and security forces to ensure the necessities of the coffee
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market: cheap land, cheap labor, and a politically inert
peasantry. This system has been described as "development
without modernization" (Weeks, 1986). The landed oligarchy
used its power to maintain pre-capitalist land systems in the
countryside while fostering the development of agro-export
economies. The result of this was the rather paradoxical
situation in which the Salvadoran state, while dependent on
the demands of foreign capital, was relatively independent of
internal interests.
Thus far dependency offers relatively strong explanatory
power of the behavior of the armed forces and their oligarchic
patrons. But when General Martinez assumed control of the
government and initiated a fifty-year era of military rule,
dependency runs into difficulty. As the Salvadoran state and
civil society grew, so too did the military institution.
Fissures between the military and the oligarchy, which grew
wider over time, first became visible in this period.
To be sure, the repressive measures taken by Martinez and
successive military regimes in the countryside and the growing
urban centers were favored by the oligarchy. It is a mistake,
though, to portray the military as the myrmidons of the
country's economic elites. Dependency theory asserts that as
the coercive apparatus of the state, the military serves the
interests of the dominant class. This view does not recognize
the military's internal logic. While its true that actions
taken by the military often served the interests of the
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oligarchy, policies were not undertaken for the oligarchy.
Rather, it is more accurate to say that the interests of the
military and landowners often coincided, but they were not
synonymous. This is a subtle, but important distinction.
Their relationship was one of symbiosis, not master and
servant. As the military's sense of purpose and mission
evolved, this relationship became increasingly strained. This
reveals a country not solely controlled by the "fourteen
families", but instead a contestation of power, a search for
hegemony
,
and intense political activity.
As the military developed, it grew out of the narrow
praetorian guard role created for it by the country's elite
and adopted a more complex ideology. This ideology is
characterized by extreme nationalism, anti-communism, and the
need to maintain hegemony. As years of in-fighting and
factionalism have shown however, the military's ideology is by
no means uniform. Above all, the history of the military has
shown it to be a profoundly political institution that regards
itself as uniquely qualified to establish and maintain order
and tranquility.
La Matanza placed the reigns of government firmly within
the hands of the military. The repression unleashed by
Martinez was waged out of a "fear of the other" and because it
was threatened by the rising militancy of the peasantry. The
military saw its ideal of society—top-down order, a
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subservient rural population, and
"anti-politics"--imperiled
by the nascent peasant and labor movements.
Dependency theory cannot account for the military's own
political identity. Faced with such a contradiction,
proponents of the theory might assert that political
arrangements necessarily reflect or express the changing
economic and social forces at work in and on a dependent
society. The kind of rule exercised, be it "shock treatment"
for the economy or alternate relaxation and intensification of
repression, are tied to the international arena (Fagen, 1977 )
.
The Salvadoran military, according to this view, crushed the
peasant uprising not because of any internal motivation, but
because the country's elite, in collusion with international
capital, demanded it. Such a position is, of course,
untenable
. This is made more apparent when the actions of the
juventud militar and military-led reformism are considered.
"What is remarkable is the 'staying power' of the
Salvadoran military," Walter and Williams remarked, "its
ability to renew its presence in the highest offices of the
state and to legitimize its presence among the people..."
(1993, p . 4 3 ) . What strikes me about the history of El
Salvador and the military in politics is not that the system
was in danger of collapsing, but that the military was able to
endure for as long as it did. The military's longevity is no
accident
.
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seen as
The coups of 1944, 1948, 1960, and 1979 can be
the military's response to crises and the need to reestablish
hegemony. In the face of rising unrest, each new government
made lofty promises to carry out land reform, to weed out
corruption, and in general to address the country's problems.
Most of these promises amounted to little and were often
followed by a period of intensified repression. This has been
the cycle of Salvadoran politics: unrest, repression, reform,
unrest, etc... A few of the military's reforms, however,
amounted to more than just rhetoric.
The establishment of the Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian
Transformation (ISTA) in 1975 and the agrarian and banking
reforms instituted after 1979, while relatively modest given
the scope of El Salvador's problems, are instructive in that
they reveal the cleavage of the military-oligarchic
relationship as well as the military's ability to maintain
legitimacy and stay in power. While individual links between
members of the oligarchy and military no doubt remained, the
military demonstrated its skill as a political actor in its
own right.
Here again the limits of dependency are apparent. The
military's pursuit of reform, while often coupled with
repression, requires that we look beyond narrow
characterizations of the military as the acolytes of the
oligarchy and world capital. Instead, the institution itself
as well as its various integration with other actors must be
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probed for answers to its behavior. By relying on dependency
theory we miss too much of the internal political and social
dynamics of El Salvador. This is not to say that the theory
is totally without merit. Dependency is useful in that it
asks us to look at the development of a country from a
historical perspective and to observe how the relations of
classes within and outside of it have shaped its development
(or lack of development)
. Further, dependency theory inserts
an international dimension that is essential to understanding
a country like El Salvador that finds itself in the United
States' sphere of influence. As stated above, dependency
adequately explains the emergence of El Salvador's armed
forces, but cannot account for its subsequent evolution into
a political actor.
Corporatism
The body of theory loosely defined as corporatism shares
with dependency many of the same limitations. There are many
versions of corporatism, but I have focused on the culturally-
based approach known as the Iberian legacy because it has been
advanced expressly as an explanation of Latin society. By
focusing almost exclusively on one set of influences, this
approach fails to account for other equally important ones.
Advocates admit to the existence of other influences, but
assign primacy to the cultural power of corporatism. At best,
I argue, corporatism presents only a partial explanation of
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the military's behavior. At worst, it denies the importance
of other influences while dismissing the worst aspects of the
military’s behavior—human rights abuses, electoral fraud, and
intolerance
—as "normal" or "natural."
Corporatism tells us where to "look" for the source of
the military's behavior. The traditions and philosophies that
make up the Iberian legacy are seen as the basis of Latin
society and government. A cursory examination of the
Salvadoran armed forces would make it easy to grant
corporatist explanations primacy.
The military exhibits behavior seemingly well-accounted
for in corporatist theory. The military's mission has been
consistency couched in terms of the need to promote "order"
and to defend la patria. Its history of political intervention
have been undertaken in the name of these ideals. The
military institution itself embodies the Iberian
characteristics of corporate order: a central, authoritative
command structure built on strict hierarchial lines. The
Salvadoran military has shown an intolerance for opposition,
but has frequently allowed certain political actors to enter
the political arena after they have demonstrated strength or
"power capability" (Shulz and Graham, 1984)
.
Once an actor is admitted, the military moves to coopt
and incorporate it, thus forestalling any threat to its own
power. The military's cautious agrarian reform projects and
its coalition with the Christian Democrats in 1979 are
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examples of this. By embracing some of the demands and
personnel of the opposition the military sought to stave off
the erosion of its legitimacy and power.
The hallmarks of corporatism—a reverence for order,
hierarchy, and cooptation—are well represented in the history
of the Salvadoran military and seem to vindicate such an
approach. Perhaps a better test of the theory's utility,
however, is to examine what it cannot explain. What questions
does it leaves unanswered? A survey of what corporatism is
not able to explain, I argue, shows not the inapplicability of
the approach, but its limits and the need for other
explanations
.
Two aspects of El Salvador's military that give the
corporatist approach difficulty are the number of non-Iberian
influences on the military and the military's participation in
politics. To begin, the Salvadoran military traces its roots
and influences not to just one tradition, but many. While it
is true that most Salvadorans have at least part Spanish
ancestry, El Salvador is not an island free of non-Iberian
influence. This is apparent in the history of the military,
yet inadequately appreciated by a corporatist approach to the
institution.
The armed forces of El Salvador received training from
Spanish officers, but also from contingents of French, German,
Chilean, and American officers as well. It is difficult to
assign dominance to any one of these. In the formative years
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the military, the European military missions had a
particularly enduring impact. European training was supposed
to foster professionalization within the military but actually
led to decidedly unprofessional behavior. As Frederick Nunn
explains in yesterday's Soldiers, a work about the effect of
European military training in South America in the years 1890-
1940, Latin American "officers reflected the traditional
European disdain for civilians.
. .and a distinct wariness of
liberal democracy" (1983, p.12). The result was military
institutions that felt compelled to intervene in politics and
suppress threats to their ideal of order. Nunn calls this
professional militarism. This involves a set of attitudes
that result in the resort to political action in an attempt to
solutions to social and economic problems.
In El Salvador, a country with less to spend on expensive
military training, much of its training came from a group of
Chilean officers who proffered a kind of "second hand
Prussianization" to the Salvadoran military. Chilean military
missions, themselves the recipients of European training, were
called in by El Salvador to "europeanize" the Salvadoran armed
forces (Rouquie, 1987) . Beginning in 1905, the Chileans spent
six years instructing the Salvadoran military (Elam, 1989)
.
The training seems to have had a lasting effect.
"The Prussian and French officers' paranoid fear of
communists, capitalists, the English, and Jews," Handelman
asserts, "was easily transferred to the South American
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military's anxieties about 'the enemy from within '"( 1987
,
p. 189 ) . Like their German and Chilean mentors, the Salvadoran
military feared communism and preferred authoritarianism to
liberal democracy. The Salvadoran military displayed more
than its share of anxiety about internal subversion and
dissent as demonstrated by La Matanza and subsequent efforts
to root out subversion.
The effect of these training missions on the armed forces
in El Salvador seems to reveal a set of behavior quite similar
to that described by proponents of culturally-based
corporatism. It would be inaccurate, however, to base any
conclusion about the military's behavior on just one
tradition. In truth, it may be impossible to know where the
Salvadoran military's propensity for anti-communism and
authoritarianism comes from. It makes more sense, I argue, to
allow for a number of influences rather confining an
interpretation to any single tradition or legacy.
A second area in which corporatism inadequately accounts
for the military's behavior is its political role. The
Iberian legacy supposedly instills the military with a disdain
for the divisive and venal ways of politicians and politics.
Yet the Salvadoran military, in its frequent coups and
alliances with various actors, has displayed behavior that
directly contradicts much of what corporatist theory holds
true
.
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Coup-making in itself is not necessarily damaging to the
theory. Stepan explains that the military's concern for
stability may actually manifest itself in a move for rapid
structural change (1978, p.34). The so-called reformist coups
in El Salvador, however, demonstrate a military motivated by
more than just the establishment of order.
One of the enduring phenomena about the Salvadoran
military has been the divisions among ideological and
generational lines. Factions within the military each saw the
role of the armed forces differently. Members of the Juventud
Militar perceived the growing politization of the peasantry,
unequal land distribution, and corruption not just as threats
to national order, but to the military institution itself.
Although groups within the military differed on the role of
the military, all agreed that maintaining its power was of
paramount importance. The coups of 1948, 1960, 1979 were all
efforts by groups of young officers to regain hegemony. These
events uncover the existence of the same kind of politics and
disunity that the military pledged to do away with.
A professional military is characterized by a well-
defined hierarchy, discipline, bureaucratization, and above
all—unity. Years of training designed to "professionalize"
the Salvadoran military have failed to create such an
institution. The military attempted to equate the maintenance
of its power with national order, but this amounted to little
more than the rhetoric of one of many political players making
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a bid for power. since 1932, when it took control of the
state, and until 1992 when its authority was challenged, the
military has shown itself to be an unprofessional,
factionalized, corrupt, and cunning political actor—a far cry
from the bastion of order and stability described by
corporatism.
The results of the 1992 peace accords may prove to
undermine corporatist explanations of the military's behavior
as well. The terms of the agreement, if fully implemented,
will fundamentally alter the armed forces. The size of the
military will be halved, the National Guard and National
Police disbanded, human rights abusers brought to trial, and
civilians will have greater oversight over their training and
activities. Why would the military agree to such terms?
The most likely explanations of the military's
acquiescence were the unlikelihood of a military victory and
its isolation. Although the armed forces had few options open
to them in 1992, their acceptance of the accords, albeit
somewhat grudging, is remarkable. According to corporatist
theory, however, the military defends the status quo and is
slow to change. The accords promise to radically restructure
civil society, heighten political activity, and fundamentally
disrupt the status quo. The peace accords, spell the end of
the preeminent role so long enjoyed by the armed forces.
Corporatism cannot explain the military's support of these
changes. More than anything else, corporatism asserts the
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permanence of cultural traditions and yet the military has
accepted the possibility of establishing a pluralistic
democracy. Corporatism is not able to explain how or why
regimes change. Time will test the military s commitment to
the terms of the accords. The fact that the military has come
this far, however, acts to weaken the utility of corporatist
theory. Like dependency theory, corporatist explanations can
offer are only of partial utility in understanding the
Salvadoran military.
Political Explanations
Based on the discussion of the Salvadoran military in the
chapters above, I have concluded that a political explanation
of the military's behavior is the most useful means of
explaining its behavior. If we take up the themes that run
through the history of the Salvadoran military, the utility of
this approach becomes clear.
The behavior of El Salvador's armed forces has been
characterized by a continual cycle of repression and reform.
I have defined this as the military's search for hegemony.
The history of the military, and El Salvador in general, have
also been shaped by the actions and frequent coups undertaken
by the j uventud militar
. And finally, despite the infusion of
money and years of training, the Salvadoran military has
remained an unprofessional institution that has constantly
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sought to augment its political autonomy. These factors lead
to a politically-based explanation of the military's behavior.
The Salvadoran military has been a repressive
organization, but not uniformly so. Like most military's in
Latin America, El Salvador's is factionalized along
ideological, functional, and generational lines. These
divisions account for variations in the military's response to
threats and the creation of them. one of the recurring
phenomena in the history of the military has been its search
for hegemony. In the case of El Salvador, the military has
sought to establish hegemony in the face of various internal
crisis. The military ruled as a government for almost fifty
years. This could not have been accomplished by domination
alone. In the face of popular unrest, economic malaise, and
international pressures, the military, often quite skillfully,
employed both coercion and hegemony. Without the use of both
the military's five decades in power may have ended much
sooner.
The behavior of the Salvadoran military is explained in
part by its struggle to maintain power; it is thus a political
actor. It is wrong to portray the military as rigid or
monolithic. It has been El Salvador's most dynamic actor. In
its efforts to maintain power and legitimacy, has engaged in
activity from outright murder to forming alliances with
members of the opposition. In its history of coup-making,
mild reforms, and suppression of dissent the military has
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shaped the face of Salvadoran history like no other actor."
The military was created by the state, but soon outgrew its
economically-based origins and developed into a political
actor in its own right, often challenging the very oligarchic
powers that created it.
Treating the Salvadoran military as a political actor
necessitates that its role vis-a-vis the state be reexamined,
yet defining the military's relation to the state is
problematic. As my discussion of the Marxist and Weberian
conceptions of the state in chapter one demonstrated, neither
definition of the state adeguately explains the military's
relation to the state. The Salvadoran military is not the
dependent arm of the dominant class nor is it a component of
the state monopolizing the legitimate use of force.
Gabriel Aguilera states that process of modernizing the
armed forces of El Salvador took place at the end of the 19th
century when then the military evolved from a "tool of
regional or personal interests" into a "state structure"
(1990, p . 2 5 )
.
While it is true that the Salvadoran military
became formally inscribed into the confines of the state and
no longer served as landowner's private guards, defining it as
part of the "state structure" is too simple and reveals little
11 I acknowledge the existence of various subaltern groups who,
had they not been suppressed, may have altered the course of
Salvadoran even more than the military.
Two excellent books that deal with the less overt forms of
resistance are Jeffrey Gould, To Lead As Equals .1990: (University
of North Carolina Press) and James C. Scott. Domination and the
Arts of Resistance
.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)
.
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about its behavior. Beginning with the personal dictatorship
of General Martinez and extending up through the end of the
civil war, the Salvadoran military has shown itself to be a
diverse collection of interests and goals that go beyond those
of a state actor.
The Salvadoran military seems to occupy a dual status of
both state and political actor. It is clear that a definition
of the military must extend beyond a functionalist one that
confines it to defending the nation from external aggression
and defending the government by preserving internal order
(Lieuwin, 1964) . The Salvadoran military cannot fit within
such a definition because it has frequently engaged in
political behavior wholly at odds with those of the
government, i.e. a coup, while at the same time based its
legitimacy on claims to defending state and national
interests
.
Rouquie explains a military's participation in a coup is
"first of all action by the state against social sectors whose
power has grown to the point that they threaten government
autonomy or endanger its functioning" (1987, p.38). This view
cannot be applied to El Salvador for it does not account for
the military's ambiguous state role. Coups in El Salvador,
such as those in 1944, 1960, and 1979, were undertaken in
response to rising social unrest, but this does not tell the
whole story. These coups should be seen not simply as the
state moving against various social sectors, but as the
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military moving against the state. In this sense, the
military can be seen as a self-interested political actor
asserting its will on the government.
If we evaluate the behavior of the military along the
political-professional continuum presented by Pion-Berlin,
several of the military's interests are revealed. Pion-Berlin
found that the military is motivated most strongly by a set of
core" interests. These basic interests are control over its
education, indoctrination, and issues of reform. The peace
accords have provided an especially candid view of the
military's interests and seem to support Pion-Berlin '
s
findings. The terms of the peace accords have put the
military's institutional autonomy in jeopardy. One high-
ranking officer stated that of all conditions stipulated in
the accords, the most unpalatable was that of creating an
academic council to oversee the military academy. Top
officers consider continued control of the military to be a
vital interest (Walter and Williams, 1993). The fact that the
military has expressed its opposition to certain terms of the
accords, however, does not necessarily entail a derailment of
democratization efforts. The military's interests seem to be
a need for institutional, not political autonomy. A
recognition of the military's interests and status as a
political actor may facilitate less-strained civil military
relations
.
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The military's recent defense of these core interests is
contrasted by the institution's history of politically-
motivated behavior. The recurrent factionalism of the
juventud militar reveals a military not only with interests
and goals of its own, but a number of conflicting interests
within the military itself. This has also been demonstrated
by the recalcitrance of members of La Tandona who have opposed
any reform of their ranks. Remmer explains, "existing
literature offers few insights into the political impact of
authoritarianism.
. . theoretical analyses of military rule have
rather consistently down-played the capacity of state actors
to induce political change" (1989, p.48). Similar to the
Fitch's discussion of the Ecuadoran armed forces, various
components of the Salvadoran military implement their own
"decision criteria" in their decision to intervene in politics
(Fitch, 1977)
.
In so doing, the juventud militar and various
tandas demonstrate the political behavior of the military.
A political approach to the military is useful in that it
moves away from essentialist perspectives that neglect
important facets of the institution while placing undue
emphasis on others. At best, however, a political approach
can serve only as a point of departure for further inquiry
into the military. Once we accept the military's status as a
political actor, more questions emerge. What lies within the
military's "black box?" The military's ideology and use of
symbols consisted of a mix of populism, McCarthyism, and
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reformism (Baloyra, 1982). How was this ideology or
-world
view" created? How does it change? What has been the effect
of the military academy's curriculum on their beliefs and
praxis? Many of these and other questions may be difficult to
answer given the secrecy and fear that surrounds the military.
The end of the war and the possibility of greater military
disclosure and civilian oversight, however, may shed new light
on the armed forces.
In a work written some years ago, Abraham Lowenthal
stressed the importance of both internal and external factors
for an theory of military behavior (1976, pp. 12-13). This
point seems particularly relevant to El Salvador, yet no
theory utilizing such a perspective has emerged.
When O'Donnel presented his bureaucratic-authoritarian
model some twenty years ago, it became the dominant paradigm
about military behavior (Handelman, 1987). Today,
bureaucratic-authoritarianism has come under criticism as too
deterministic and too specific to a particular set of
circumstances. 12 Further, like much of the work on the
military in Latin America, its focus was on the nations of
South America not Central America. None the less, it appears
that both regions are now without any compelling model of
military behavior. This, however, should not be cause for
alarm but rather cause for optimism.
12 Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merkx offer a thorough
critique of the model in "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,"
Latin American Research Review 17, no. 2 (1982): 3-40.
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In a review of works on the Latin American military,
Barry Ames wrote: "We now seem to be without a dominant
theoretical paradigm, and because there are no aspects of the
military on which closure has been reached, the coming years
should be a period of exploration and experimentation in
studies of Latin American militaries" (1988, p.169). I would
add that the coming years should not be characterized by a
search for any "dominant theoretical paradigm," but instead
for approaches that account for multiple-causality and over-
determination. Such an effort must be far less wedded to any
one level of analysis than the ones that came before it.
Rather than search for some overarching understanding of the
military, we may have to settle for a less ambitious,
desegregate approach.
Conclusions
El Salvador's civil war has come to an end, but the end
of hostilities is by no means certain. Although the
possibility of a genuine transition to democracy is more
propitious than ever before, substantial challenges remain.
Democracy and democratization are defined in various ways. It
is possible to set a standard that, is so high that it may
never be reached. Years of war in El Salvador have raised the
consciousness of a great many Salvadorans. Whether they
supported the FMLN or not, it is doubtful the country's
vigorous civil society will accept a "democracy" characterized
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by austere, neo- liberal economic measures that do not address
the country many needs. I will conclude with a brief look
at the experiences of other Latin American nations as a means
of comparing them to El Salvador. I will close with a look
towards the March 1994 presidential elections and what they
may hold in store for both the Salvadoran military and the
country
.
Comparative Perspectives
Future research on the Salvadoran military that brings in
the comparative experience of other nations that have emerged
from years of authoritarian rule may prove to be valuable.
The case of Guatemala is instructive. There are many
parallels between Guatemala and El Salvador. The military in
Guatemala regarded itself as the only institution capable of
providing order and stability in the face of powerful
guerrillas armies. Both countries experienced long periods of
military rule that resulted in the suppression of civil
society and the deaths of thousands. The inauguration of
Vinicio Cerezo in 1986, a Christian Democrat like Duarte,
marked the transfer of power from the military to civilian
control. Guatemala is currently grappling with many of the
same questions now facing El Salvador: How can the power of
the military be reduced? Why did the military acquiesce to
civilian authority? How should democratic institutions be
fostered? Should past human rights abusers be brought to
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justice? What will be the military's role in a democratic
setting?
Jim Handy offers a grim assessment of current civil-
military relations in Guatemala. Many cite the country's
economic misfortune as well as the military's need for foreign
aid as the reason behind the military's concession to civilian
power. These two explanations of the military's acceptance of
civilian government, Handy states, suggest it will be short-
lived (1986, pp. 383-385). He presents a situation similar to
that in El Salvador. Because of the military's predominance
in Guatemalan politics and often subtle use of power, the
military will continue to play a significant role in
"democratic Guatemala."
Handy states that while "...the alterations in the
political structure in Guatemala during the twentieth century
have changed the degree of military influence in the political
process, they have never ended it. A reduction of direct
military influence does not, in itself, signify a democratic
revival" (1986, p.386). Handy describes the Guatemalan
military in political terms and this leads him to his less-
than-optimistic appraisal of their place in the country's
future. Yet recent events in Guatemala are cause for optimism
and may be comparable to El Salvador's situation.
Perhaps one of the most revealing episodes in Guatemala's
recent history was the military's behavior in the autogolpe
carried out in May of 1993. At first the miliary high command
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rallied behind the cause of President Jorge Serrano and joined
in his efforts to dissolve the constitution and National
Assembly to
-weed out corruption." As soon as it became
apparent that neither Guatemalans nor the international
community would tolerate the measures taken by Serrano, the
military changed its course. Like any political actor, the
military could read the writing on the wall. The political
climate at home and abroad did not bode well for a return to
exclusionary rule. Weighing the relative costs of siding with
Serrano or what seemed like the rest of Guatemalan society, it
chose the latter and perhaps gained a dose of badly needed
legitimacy. In an event replete with irony, the miliary stood
beside the election of former human rights ombudsman Ramiro de
Leon Carpio, an individual who routinely condemned the abuses
of the Guatemalan military. This event may be auspicious for
El Salvador.
The Guatemalan military's decision to side with civil
society shows that an armed institution long—schooled in the
black arts of repression and counter-insurgency, will not
necessarily chose a resumption of authoritarianism over
democratic rule. The military tested the political winds and
saw its interests better served in a return to constitutional
authority. The point here is that the militaries in Guatemala
and El Salvador are not predisposed to monolithic, anti-
democratic behavior. If the siding with unions, students, and
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other members of civil society serves the military's interests
then the military will likely chose that course.
A second inference can be drawn from the case of
Guatemala. The number of dead in Guatemala, which has yet to
resolve its civil war, is more than 100,000. The number of
Salvadorans killed in the course of the civil war is generally
put at 75,000. Most of these individuals were civilians.
What is encouraging about civilian-ruled Guatemala is the
vitality of its political society. it is doubtful that the
military would have come out against Serrano's autogolpe as it
did without the outpouring of demonstrations and opposition
from a wide variety of Guatemalan society. Decades of
repression and a "culture of fear" have not destroyed the
akility of traditionally dominated sectors of society from
speaking out. El Salvador, which always had a relatively
active popular sector, may react to future transgressions by
the military or any other sector with a similar outcry.
The nations of the South America may also offer useful
comparisons to El Salvador. Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and
Uruguay all suffered from particularly long periods of
military rule. One of the most pressing issues facing these
countries is the need to address human rights abuses committed
under authoritarian rule. In Chile, for example, after the
13 See the discussion of the effects of state terror in Juan
E. Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garreton,
eds., Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin
America (University of California Press: Oxford, 1992)
.
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overthrow of Salvador Allende in 1973, the country experienced
a particularly brutal period of miliary rule under General
Pinochet that ended with the election of Patricio Aylwin in
1989. As Chile attempts to consolidate its transition to
democracy, one of the biggest problems facing that country is
the issue of past human rights abuses committed by the armed
forces
.
The abuses committed by the military are well-documented
and I will not recount them here. Civilian presidents have
side-stepped the issue of military crime in an attempt to move
away from its authoritarian past, yet the specter of the dead
and tortured remain. In 1986, President Alfonsin declared the
Punto Final which ended investigation of hundreds of cases of
human rights abuses. In 1989, President Menem pardoned over
200 military officers and in 1990 pardoned the members of the
notorious junta involved in the "dirty war" (McSherry, 1992).
These actions and others undermine the possibility of greater
democratic advancement.
J. Patrise McSherry explains that, "the possibility for
achieving socio-economic change in the interests of the
majorities, or establishing mechanisms to ensure participation
for subordinate classes excluded by the military regimes,
remains threatened as long as politicized and undemocratic
military/security forces remain above the law, protected by
impunity ..."( 1992
,
p.464). In both Argentina and El Salvador
the military enjoyed impunity from prosecution. El Salvador
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can profit from Argentina's example. An overwhelming majority
of Argentines oppose granting the military amnesty. a poll
taken in 1990 put this number at 95 percent (Reuters, 1990 NYT
12/31/90) .
In El Salvador, a lieutenant and a colonel were convicted
for there role in the murder of the 1989 murder of six jesuit
priests and two women. Although a conviction of a member of
the armed forces is unprecedented, many observers contend that
the intellectual authors of the crime escaped punishment
(Christian, 1991) . The results of the Truth Commission, a UN
task force that implicated scores of military officials in
human rights crimes, as well a growing anti
-militarist
sentiment in El Salvador seem to indicate that future
governments will not easily evade the issue of military
crimes (Walter and Williams, 1993). If El Salvador, like
Argentina, is to restore faith in its institutions and promote
a democracy, punishing those who lived outside the law for so
long will be an important measure of its commitment to these
goals
.
Elections and Beyond
The presidential elections scheduled for March 1994 will
be an important test of the military's commitment to the terms
of the peace accords and of El Salvador's chances of
democratic consolidation. Based on the conclusions reached in
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this thesis, it is possible to speculate about possible
outcomes and their effect on the military.
The main contenders for the presidency are ARENA, the
Christian Democrats, the Democratic Convergence, and the FMLN.
Several smaller parties will also participate. The most
likely scenario is an ARENA victory.
ARENA presided over a period of economic growth and the
end of the civil war. Due to its vast economic resources,
ARENA began its campaign well before any other party. A
victory of ARENA'S candidate, San Salvador's mayor Armando
Calderon Sol, would be the most favorable outcome for the
military. Although outgoing president Alfredo Christiani
represented a sanitized version of ARENA, the military can
expect the most favorable treatment from the inauguration of
another ARENA administration. Since the military still wields
a considerable amount of power in the countryside, one may
wonder how vigorously ARENA will pursue reforms of the armed
forces as spelled out in the accords. Much of the party's
economic power still lies in the coffee and cattle-raising
regions of the country and is thus eager to protect these
interests. If ARENA wins the presidency, I suspect the
military will be subjected to the minimum number of restraints
and reforms necessary to appease Salvadorans at home and
observers abroad.
A victory by the FMLN is unlikely. The former guerrilla
group is made up of five different parties: the People's
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Revolutionary Army (ERP)
,
the National Resistance (RN)/ the
Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)
,
the Communist Party (PC)
,
and
the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)
.
These groups are divided over the proper election strategy.
The ERP and RN argue that the FMLN should move toward the
political center as a coalition with other centrist parties
such as the Democratic Convergence and the Christian
Democrats. On the other hand, the FPL, PC, and PRTC advocate
a more leftist approach in which each party enters the
election alone (Serrano, 1993). Further damaging the FMLN '
s
chances for electoral victory was the discovery of a large
arms cache in Managua in July of 1993. This has hurt the
organizations ' s credibility and has been played up by ARENA.
Even though their victory is unlikely, it is useful to
speculate about what an FMLN-led presidency would mean for the
military.
One of the first moves the FMLN would likely take is the
installation of a civilian Minister of Defense. Although the
accords do not call for the appointment of a civilian to this
position, such a change would be an important step in greater
civilian oversight of the military. It is almost certain,
however, that the armed forces would vehemently oppose a
civilian in the defense ministry. General Vargas, a
progressive member of the high command, explained that a
civilian appointment would be "difficult" on the grounds that
civilians lack the expertise and "political education" needed
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for the job. Similarly, Colonel Corado Figueroa argued that
the public itself would oppose such a move because "a civilian
would project an image of lack of solidarity" and lead to the
"weakening of the armed forces" (Walter and Williams, 1993 ).
With only two years since the end of the war, an FMLN-led
government may place too much strain on El Salvador's emerging
democracy. It is likely that a great deal of mistrust still
exists between former military and guerrilla combatants.
Placing former enemies into the same government could be
disastrous
.
Perhaps one of the most important factors in the future
of the Salvadoran military is the continuation of
international pressure and attention. The roles played by the
UN, and ultimately the US, were pivotal in bringing the civil
war to an end. Similarly, various human rights groups placed
great pressure on the military to reform. A former Salvadoran
security official discussed the effect of this pressure on the
military's treatment of suspected subversives:
In general, you will kill the prisoners because there's
an assumption they shouldn't live. If we pass them to
the judge, they'll go free and we'll have to pick them up
again. If there's lots of pressure— like from Amnesty
International or some foreign country—then we might pass
them on to a judge, but if there's no pressure, then
they're dead (Pyes, 1986).
During the Reagan administration, US and popular
attention was fixated on Central America. With the electoral
defeat of the Sandinistas in 1989 and the end of the civil war
in El Salvador, international attention has all but
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disappeared from the region. This is unfortunate. if the
trend continues, the military will likely feel less compelled
to change its behavior.
Finally, one of the most important questions facing the
armed forces and El Salvador in general is a redefinition of
the military's mission. El Salvador was never faced with
severe external threats and thus based its role on combatting
domestic threats. Now that the civil war has ended, the
military can no longer base its legitimacy on the fight
against communism and internal subversion.
The Salvadoran military is not a legion of sadistic
deathsquads
,
nor is it a bastion of freedom and democratic
ideals. Like El Salvador's past, the future of the country
and its military are inexorably linked. it is unlikely that
the military will maintain the power it has had for so long.
Yet as eager as the people of El Salvador are to make a break
from the past, it is also doubtful that a democratic El
Salvador will be able to exclude a politically-motivated actor
like the armed forces either.
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